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PRESENTATION
Peter Singer is an influential moral philosopher. Some have called
him the most practically influential philosopher in the twentieth century1.
A review of his book Rethinking Life and Death published in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine described him as the philosopher who has «had a
larger popular readership than any professional philosopher since Bertrand
Russell, and more success in effecting changes in acceptable behaviour»2.
His book Animal Liberation sold over 400 000 copies in nine languages3.
Practical Ethics sold over 100 000 copies in ten languages.
1. The original quote which has been repeated in numerous articles, is the follow-
ing: «Peter Singer may be the most controversial philosopher alive; he is certainly
among the most influential». New Yorker, Sept 6, 1999 by Michael Specter. For entire
article see http://www.michaelspecter.com/ny/1999/1999_09_06_philosopher.html.
2. SPIKE, Jeffrey, New England Journal of Medicine, 333, 22 (1995) p. 1509. The
complete quote is the following: «Philosophers, notoriously, are an ivory-towered lot.
One philosopher who has never fit that mould is the Australian Peter Singer. Indeed, he
has probably had a larger popular readership than any professional philosopher since
Bertrand Russell, and more success in effecting changes in acceptable behaviour. Inter-
estingly, Singer is an adherent of a moral theory similar to Russell’s, the very modern,
Western, democratic (and some would say very British) theory of Utilitarianism».
3. On Paul McCartney’s 1993 world tour copies of the book were sold alongside t-
shirts. SEE JAMIESON, Dale (ed.), Singer and His Critics, Blackwell, Publishers 1999, p. 1.
Resumen. El objetivo de esta tesis es estu-
diar los fundamentos de la filosofía de Peter
Singer. Es conocido como un autor consis-
tente y lógico. Esta investigación ha tenido
como meta verificar esta opinión. Singer rec-
hazó el intuicionismo, pero su principio fun-
damental –«desinterés» o «punto de vista
universal»– es en el fondo intuicionista. Singer
también rechaza el subjetivismo como base
válida para un sistema de ética, pero su propio
sitema es subjetivista. Asimismo, sostiene
que la filosofía debe utilizar activamente las
ciencias empíricas, pero su uso de esas cien-
cias es selectivo y arbitrario. En conclusión,
Peter Singer demuestra gran inconsistencia
en su sistema ético.
Palabras clave: Peter Singer, ética, cogni-
tivismo, intuicionismo.
Abstract. This aimed to study the funda-
mental principles of the moral philosophy of
Peter Singer. Singer is attributed as being
thoroughly logical and consistent. The aim
was to verify the truth of this claim. Al-
though Peter Singer vigorously rejected intu-
itionism, his key principle –disinterestedness
or point of view of the universe– is intuitive.
Singer actively rejected subjectivism as a
valid basis for an ethical system and yet on
close inspection of his system it is subjec-
tivist in nature. He believed moral philoso-
phy should actively utilize the knowledge
provided by the other sciences, which he
uses this knowledge is selective and arbi-
trary. In conclusion, he demonstrates incon-
sistency in his moral philosophy.
Key words: Peter Singer, ethics, cognitivism,
intuitionism.
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Singer takes pride in being a moral philosopher. He believes his
contribution to this privileged profession is to construct ethics on solid rea-
soning, free from any irrational influences. Even opponents of Singer have
credited him with being a thoroughly logical person.
Is such a conclusion justified? In order to assess this, in the follow-
ing pages Singer’s fundamental moral philosophy –not his ethical conclu-
sions on such matters as infanticide or euthanasia– will be examined,
drawing on his articles and books which touch upon the philosophical ba-
sis of his ethics.
Much has been written on Singer’s views on infanticide, assisted
suicide, cloning and even bestiality. He generates intense reactions, some
portraying him as a modern day Nazi, the ethicist who wants to kill dis-
abled people or, as one prominent ecclesiastic called him, Herod’s Propa-
ganda Chief4.
In a recent interview, Singer defended necrophilia5. Previously in
the magazine Nerve he supported bestiality6. Such atypical views make it
difficult to analyse Singer, some easily dismissing him without deeper
philosophical analysis. For others, the questions he raises, on first glance,
appear to have no ready answers.
Singer claimed the modern moral philosopher, armed with reason
and modern facts, will create a Copernican revolution in ethics, opening up
a more advanced way to live. «It is time for another Copernican revolu-
tion. It will be, once again, a revolution against a set of ideas we have in-
herited from the period in which the intellectual world was dominated by a
religious outlook. Because it will change our tendency to see human be-
ings as the centre of the ethical universe, it will meet with fierce resistance
from those who do not want to accept such a blow to our human pride. At
first, it will have its own problems, and will need to tread carefully over
new ground. For many the ideas will be too shocking to take seriously. Yet
eventually the change will come. The traditional view that all human life is
sacrosanct is simply not able to cope with the array of issues that we face.
The new view will offer a fresh and more promising approach»7.
Peter Singer, a young student and antiwar activist, went to Oxford
and proposed to Richard Hare8, who was professor of moral philosophy,
12 AMIN JOHN ABBOUD
4. EGAN, Richard, «Herod’s Propaganda Chief», News Weekly, October 21, 1995,
p. 14. («Saintly of Satanic?» Time Magazine [Australia], November 2, 1989).
5. Interview with Marvin Olasky found in http://www.townhall.com/columnists/
marvinolasky/mo20041202.shtml.
6. SINGER, Peter, Heavy Petting found in Nerve, http://www.nerve.com/Opinions/
Singer/heavyPetting.
7. SINGER, Peter, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional
Ethics, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 1994, p. 189
8. Richard Mervyn Hare (1919-2002). His thought will be presented in chapter eight.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 12
that he embark on a doctoral thesis about civil disobedience. This would
end with his first book Democracy and Disobedience 9.
Into the apparent stagnation of ideology entered Peter Singer, now a
qualified moral philosopher. He was not just going to be some simple com-
mentator on ethics. In an article in The New York Times Magazine, July 7,
1974 titled «Philosophers Are Back on the Job» he said: «The death of eth-
ical and political argument over important public questions was only tem-
porary». A new breed of moral philosopher, interested in practical action,
was here to fix up the mess.
Singer is not interested in abstract discussion of moral philosophy
limited to university halls, but approaches ethics with a passion often lack-
ing amongst other moral philosophers. In some senses he has captured, in
part, what classical authors considered ethics to be: a speculative science
about practical matters. His insistence on applied ethics resulted in his first
major ethical work, Practical Ethics 10.
«Ethics is about how we ought to live. What makes an action the
right, rather than the wrong thing to do? What should our goals be? These
questions are so fundamental that they lead us on to further questions.
What is ethics anyway? Where does it come from? Can we really hope to
find a rational way of deciding how we ought to live? If we can, what
would it be like, and how are we going to know when we have found
it?»11.
How does Singer define ethics? «Ethics, also called moral philoso-
phy is the discipline concerned with what is morally good and bad, right
and wrong. The term is also applied to any system or theory of moral val-
ues or principles»12.
What is the link between ethics and other sciences? Can we learn any-
thing from them? Can ethics be reduced to another science? Singer again ex-
plains: «Although ethics has always been viewed as a branch of philosophy,
its all-embracing practical nature links it with many other areas of study, in-
cluding anthropology, biology, economics, history, politics, sociology, and
theology. Yet, ethics remains distinct from such disciplines because it is not a
matter of factual knowledge in the way that the sciences and other branches
of inquiry are. Rather, it has to do with determining the nature of normative
theories and applying these sets of principles to practical moral problems»13.
This excerpt presents a critique of Singer’s philosophical principles
in detail, in the light of his own aims. Although it is quite difficult to find a
PRESENTATION 13
9. SINGER, Peter, Democracy and Disobedience, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1973.
10. SINGER, Peter, Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979.
11. SINGER, Peter (ed.), Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, p. 3.
12. SINGER, Peter, «Ethics-Introduction», Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2004 Edition.
13. Ibid.
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clear exposition of these principles in his own writings, I will present
enough to make a clear assessment.
I will demonstrate that Singer’s fundamental principles and ideas,
although eloquently presented, are inconsistent, often contradictory, and at
times illogical by his own standards. Moreover, I will highlight that his ra-
tionality is based on a very peculiar definition of rationality which is open
to criticism.
Paradoxically, Singer will create a system that fails to meet the min-
imum standards of rigour demanded by the empirical sciences he wanted
to emulate. The only way it can meet the condition of being rational is to
accept his own definitions of rationality, which I will show is quite arbi-
trary. In many senses Singer is a modern day sophist, winning arguments
by sophisticated debate than by truth in argumentation.
Using the analogy of science, if the fundamental moral principles
are the theoretical scientific foundations of applied science –normative
ethics– then these limitations in Singer’s theoretical foundation nullify his
normative conclusions.
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Sergio Sánchez-
Migallón for his encouragment, guidance and effort which made possible
the completion of this thesis.
I would also like to thank the Faculty of Ecclesiastical Philosophy
of the University of Navarre for providing me with the environment and
training to be able to embark on this philosophical project, specifically to
Professor José Angel Garcia Cuadrado for his support.
I would also like to thank the Colegio Mayor Aralar in Pamplona
for providing me with a very supportive environment during my time in
that special city, especially the Rector Dr. Ernesto Peñacoba.
Many others merit mention and I will express my gratitude person-
ally and effusively.
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THE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY
OF PETER SINGER AND THE METHODOLOGY
OF UTILITARIANISM
1. A CRITIQUE OF SINGER’S USE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY
The Expanding Circle was published in 1981. It was an effort by
Singer to explain the origins of human ethics, and from that base to explain
how we can construct a newly reasoned ethical theory.
In 1982 he published an article in the journal Philosophy and Pub-
lic Affairs which dealt with the same material1. He has reiterated these
same ideas, with no notable change, in introductions to various anthologies
or companions to ethics and also in his Encyclopaedia Britannica article,
«Ethics» right up to the most recent editions2. He has not retracted or mod-
ified in any significant sense what he proposed in 1981 and it can be as-
sumed that he still holds those ideas.
The three main critiques of The Expanding Circle which appeared
in philosophical journals in English speaking countries can be summarised
as unsympathetic. The authors considered merit in studying sociobiology
and its association with ethics, yet in general they found Singer’s contribu-
tion poorly developed, lacking rigour and used as a platform to promote
his own preconceived ideas3.
N. J. H. Dent writing in Mind would claim that those «who know
little or nothing of evolutionary theory, or of sociobiology or of elementary
ethical theory will come away form Singer’s book knowing more. But
those who know something of these already and hope to find in it a deep-
ening and widening of their understanding will, I believe, find it frustrat-
ing, for it disappoints that hope»4.
1. SINGER, Peter, «Ethics and Sociobiology», Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11
(1982), pp. 40-64.
2. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2006 edition. «Ethics-origins of ethics».
3. In this thesis, the terms «sociobiology» and «evolutionary ethics» will be used
interchangeably.
4. DENT, N. J. H., «Book review of “The Expanding Circle”», Mind, New Series,
93 (1984), pp. 138-140.
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Dent found the book bland and asks: «To whom is this book ad-
dressed? Not, one supposes, to the “professional philosopher” nor to the
even half sophisticated philosophy student who hardly needs the entry of
each new name to be prefaced thus: “the French philosopher” Rousseau
(p.3) or “the Cambridge philosopher” Henry Sidgwick (p.29), and who
would find the almost ritualistic working through of the naturalistic fallacy
(pp.72 ff.) quite unchallenging. Singer must, I take it, have in view the in-
quiring layman and perhaps such a one would fine the book rewarding
enough. But even in this case I feel that the book insufficiently invites
thought, insufficiently provokes serious reflection or questioning whether
about sociobiology or the fundamental basis of ethics. We have what is
more like the presentation of a prepared statement than a piece of philo-
sophical inquiry and argumentation»5.
Dent would further argue that Singer (The Expanding Circle p.139)
is unable to give an explanation of why altruism to strangers has not disap-
peared completely through evolution. The explanation offered is that rea-
son is selected for in humans and altruism to strangers will follow. He
claims this argument is vague at best. Moreover, Singer stresses this «rea-
son» is to consider interests impartially. Dent does not consider the two ar-
guments go together and Singer does not offer reasons why they should.
From an evolutionary point of view they probably should not6. He believes
Singer in fact ridiculously presents the possibility of being able to encour-
age ethical conduct but spread it genetically7.
Anthony Manser, reviewing the book in The Philosophical Quar-
terly, said: «Sociobiology certainly stands in need of philosophical examina-
tion, and Singer has seen some of the problems which it raises. Unfortu-
nately, he has been taken in by it to an extent which renders his
examination less than useful than it might have been»8. He goes on to say
that serious biology cannot be done from the armchair, as Singer has done.
Arthur Caplan, writing in the journal Ethics, went further: «Singer
does an excellent job of laying out the central tenets of sociobiological the-
ory. He is less adept at thinking critically about the use to which this theo-
ry can be put in explanation the evolution of morality»9.
Caplan critiqued the evolution of certain behavioural traits due to
selective advantages in scenarios Singer proposed. Many of these scenar-
ios presume «scarcity and struggle for resources. But in a world of small,
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5. Ibid., Italics not in original.
6. Ibid., pp. 138-140
7. SINGER, Peter, The Expanding Circle..., p. 173.
8. MANSER, Anthony, «Book review “The Expanding Circle”», The Philosophical
Quarterly, 33, no.132. Special Issue: Medicine and Ethics (1983) pp. 305-307.
9. CAPLAN, Arthur L., «Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science; The
Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology», Ethics, 93, No.3 (1983), pp. 603-606.
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isolated populations, abundant resources, and numerous virulent diseases,
selection may not be a very powerful agent in shaping human behavioural
evolution»10. He stresses that these biological factors do not account for
«cultural evolution» through imitation, mimicry and learning further ac-
centuating his scepticism.
Caplan’s critique highlights Singer’s conclusion that impartiality
and equal consideration of interests as the only most reasonable founda-
tions for morality among rational creatures is highly presumptuous and
does not allow for love, compassion, kindness, friendship and other factors
which are important in interpersonal relationships11.
From the above survey of the reviews that appeared in journals, it is
clear that in professional philosophical circles, even amongst philosophers
sympathetic to Singers applied ethics (such as Caplan), they uniformly
concluded that Singer had not approached the subject with rigour, was su-
perficial in his treatment of the evidence of sociobiology, and makes leaps
of logic in his imposition of impartiality and universal consideration of in-
terests.
While it could be argued that the book was aimed at a general audi-
ence (an argument I will consider further along), The Expanding Circle
was not just an exposition of a general idea, but was laying foundations for
the origin of ethics and metaethics specifically in his own thought. This
book, despite its limitations, represents the most unified, detailed and sys-
tematic presentation of Singer’s fundamental principles that can be found.
Consequently, its lack of clarity makes it very difficult to discover on what
basis Singer’s theory is actually founded12. Claiming to appeal to the
layperson could be misinterpreted as inability to speak and convince ex-
perts in the field of moral philosophy –while at the same time always
claiming a special role as a moral philosopher– and trying to do some «pop
moral philosophising».
In order to present a detailed critique of Singer’s use of sociobiolo-
gy, I will outline a brief history of evolutionary ethics up to the early part
of the twentieth century where it faded in relevance. Then a brief survey of
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10. Ibid., p. 605.
11. «Similarly, impartiality and a principle requiring the equal consideration of in-
terests may be norms that ought to govern the attitudes and behaviour of judges, arbitra-
tors, police officers, and government representatives. But it seems ludicrous to argue
that rationality demands that each individual in every social role always attend to every-
one’s interests equally and impartially. This is a prescription for physical exhaustion, not
morality». Ibid., p. 605.
12. In the subsequent chapter I will also refer to another very brief section of key
principles at the beginning of Practical Ethics. Nevertheless there again Singer declares
that he does not aim to explain those principles nor defend them against criticism, mak-
ing it problematic to ascertain exactly what he considered on these subjects.
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the more recent history of this area of investigation which was more ener-
getically renewed in the 1960’s and 1970’s. This will be followed by a
presentation of recent scientific data together with summaries of articles
which have tried to make sense of what data does exist and the explanatory
theories supported by the data. Many of the articles reviewed are written
by those defending sociobiology yet explaining frankly the problems of
the theory.
As Singer based his ideas heavily on the key aspects and presumed
scientific evidence for the origin of ethics to be found in evolutionary biol-
ogy, the initial part of this chapter will serve as an indirect critique of The
Expanding Circle before I address some questions specific to his own
thought. Many of the errors and approaches of the evolutionary ethicists
are also found in Singer.
History of Evolutionary Ethics
Charles Darwin
The effort to find a biological explanation for human ethics has
been persistent since it was initiated by Charles Darwin. Darwin realised
that evolutionary theory would have difficulty in being accepted if it
couldn’t explain the existence of human morality. Some considered the
moral sense of the human person a confirmation for the divine origin of the
human species. If moral sense could not be explained by evolution, then the
theory was open to the accusation that human beings were still the result of
an act of creation. «I fully subscribe to the judgement of those writers who
maintain that all of the differences between man and the lower animals, the
moral sense or conscience is by far the most important. (...) It is the most
noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment’s hesita-
tion to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature; or after due deliberation,
impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some
great cause»13.
Darwin devotes two chapters of his book, The Descent of Man, to
the origin and development of the moral sense. He studied animal instincts
and from these studies arrived at conclusions which remain as the basis of
the approach to this question in modern sociobiology.
He began with the premise that the basis of moral sense lay in the
need for some animals (e.g. ants, bees, wolves etc) to live cooperatively in
order to survive. This group behaviour was called altruistic behaviour, a
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13. DARWIN, Charles, The Descent of Man, 2nd edition, John Murray, London,
1875. pp. 97-111.
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survival mechanism that facilitated the survival of the species. He would
then elaborate an explanation of the evolutionary origin of moral sense:
«The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable,
namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social in-
stincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would in-
evitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual
powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man. For,
firstly, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of
its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform
various services for them. The services may be of a definite and evidently
instinctive nature; or there may be only a wish and readiness, as with most
of the higher social animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways.
But these feelings and services are by no means extended to all the individ-
uals of the same species, only to those of the same association. Secondly, as
soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all
past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of
each individual: and that feeling of dissatisfaction, or even misery, which
invariably results, as we shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct,
would arise, as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always pres-
ent social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger,
but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind it a very vivid impres-
sion. It is clear that many instinctive desires, such as that of hunger, are in
their nature of short duration; and after being satisfied, are not readily or
vividly recalled. Thirdly, after the power of language had been acquired,
and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion
how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally be-
come in a paramount degree the guide to action. But it should be borne in
mind that however great weight we may attribute to public opinion, our re-
gard for the approbation and disapprobation of our fellows depends on
sympathy, which, as we shall see, forms an essential part of the social in-
stinct, and is indeed its foundation-stone. Lastly, habit in the individual
would ultimately play a very important part in guiding the conduct of each
member; for the social instinct, together with sympathy, is, like any other
instinct, greatly strengthened by habit, and so consequently would be obe-
dience to the wishes and judgment of the community»14.
This citation comes from chapter four the 1874 edition of the De-
scent of Man which covered the topics of moral sense, the social qualities
of animals and the origin of sociability and the struggle between opposed
instincts. Here Darwin, aims to offer an explanation of why man is a social
animal and how there can be so called transmission of moral tendencies.
In chapter five titled, On the development of the intellectual and
moral faculties during primeval and civilised times, he traces the advance-
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ment of intellectual powers through natural selection, and how civilisation
progresses from once barbarous peoples to the nineteenth century enlight-
ened gentleman.
Darwin essentially proposed that kinship and other mores have an
instinctive origin. Subsequently, there was the evolutionary step with the
development of intellectual animals who possessed an advanced reasoning
capacity leading to the development of conscience.
He proposes the «greatest happiness principle» as the standard of
right and wrong in these more intellectual animals. The definition of good
and evil given by Darwin is that of a hedonistic utilitarian, good being that
which maximises pleasure and minimises pain. Doing good to other hu-
mans is seen in terms of a biological inclination towards altruism and sym-
pathy, which he believed was helpful to survival. This schematic view of
Darwin’s thought be the basis of all subsequent explanations of evolution-
ary ethics, together with the contribution of Herbert Spencer.
Herbert Spencer
The next most prominent thinker in this area was Herbert Spencer.
He began his writings on ethics, in a pre-evolutionary phase, publishing his
first treatise on ethics, Social Statistics (1851), eight years before the Origin
of Species. Nearly thirty years later, his Principles of Ethics (1879-1893)
contains a profound influence of evolutionary theory, yet in a more moderat-
ed form not containing the elaborated or intense application of evolution to
ethics which comes through in the preceding book, Data of Ethics (1879).
Spencer is the philosopher who most worked the theory of evolu-
tion into ethics (prior to the more recent efforts of Wilson), writing exten-
sively and modifying his theory with time. Despite his theoretical applica-
tion and evaluation of evolution to ethics, Spencer is honest enough to
admit the limitations of this approach in the preface to his final work on
this area of philosophy titled Negative Beneficence and Positive Benefi-
cence (1893). «The Doctrine of Evolution has not furnished guidance to
the extent I had hoped. Most of the conclusions, drawn empirically, are
such as right feelings, enlightened by cultivated intelligence, have already
sufficed to establish». This honest summary of Spencer, is an apt summary
of this entire area of inquiry right up to our own time.
In his pre evolutionary phase, Spencer was very critical of the Ben-
thamite «doctrine of expediency» where all men seek as a guide for con-
duct, the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Spencer argued the
standards of happiness are infinite, as the faculties of men differ extensive-
ly and balance of desires. Thus the notion of happiness must vary with the
disposition and character of each person and hence must be quite varied.
40 AMIN JOHN ABBOUD
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Consequently, «a true conception of what human life should be, is possible
only for the ideal man....And as the world yet contains none such, it fol-
lows that a specific idea of «greatest happiness» is for the present unattain-
able». Spencer would go on to say that the expediency doctrine is not an
axiom but a «enunciation of a problem to be solved»15. At this phase of his
writing, Spencer advocated some type of moral sense theory16.
In the intervening period of thirty years between Social Statistics
(1851) and the Data of Ethics (1879), Spencer had changed substantially.
An admirer of the sciences, he had witnessed a progress in biological sci-
ences and wanted to employ that in ethics. Data of Ethics has first two
chapters titled «Conduct in General» and «The Evolution of Conduct».
The concept of the ideal man which he had worked into his early writings
to explain different ideas takes more relief here with the struggle for exis-
tence leading to the development of this «ideal man». «Ethics has for its
subject-matter, that form which universal conduct assumes during the last
stages of its evolution»17.
At this stage, Spencer acknowledged the importance of gaining
pleasure and avoiding pain as directing principles of action. Moral good
was equated with facilitating human pleasure. Pleasure could be achieved
in two ways, first by satisfying our own pleasurable impulses or by satisfy-
ing the pleasurable impulses of others. Hence, giving food to others gives
us pleasure. Moreover, human cooperation is necessary to achieve our
aims and hence we develop principles of equity and altruism. Summarising
his analysis, he concludes: «If we call good every kind of conduct which
aids the lives of others, and do this under the belief that life brings more
happiness than misery; then it becomes undeniable that, taking into ac-
count the immediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is univer-
sally the pleasurable»18.
Amongst all evolutionary ethicists, there is a desire to reject any di-
vine origin to ethics. In Darwin’s autobiography, he makes the following
statement: «A man who has no assured and ever-present belief in the exis-
tence of a personal God or of a future existence with retribution and reward,
can have for his rule of life, as far as I can see, only to follow those impulses
and instincts which are the strongest or which seem to him the best ones»19.
Spencer, similarly, would say of «theological theories»: «Religious
creeds, established and dissenting, all embody the belief that right and
THE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF PETER SINGER... 41
15. SPENCER, Herbert, Social Statistics, 1851, Introduction: «The Doctrine of Expe-
diency», § 2.
16. Ibid., Introduction: «The Doctrine of the Moral Sense», § 5.
17. SPENCER, Herbert, Data of Ethics, 1879, Chapter Two: §§ 6, 7.
18. Ibid., Chapter Three, §§ 9, 10.
19. DARWIN, Charles, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, Nora
Barlow (ed.), Norton, New York 1958, p. 94.
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wrong are right and wrong simply in virtue of divine enactment. And this
tacit assumption has passed from systems of theology into systems of
morality»20.
Spencer also rejects intuitionism, claiming that «pure intuitionists»
are equated with those «who affirm we know some things to be right and
others wrong by virtue of a supernaturally given conscience»21. He would
explain why intuition has an appeal, blending it with his evolutionary
ideas. «Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed
by any living individual, to have arisen from organised and consolidated
experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their
slowly-developed nervous organisations, just as I believe this intuition, re-
quiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences,
has practically become a form of thought, apparently quite independently
of experience; so do I believe that the experiences of utility organised and
consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been
producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued
transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of
moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct,
which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility»22.
Obviously, Spencer has inverted the order of evolution where nor-
mally a mutation provides a fitness advantage while, here we see more
Lamarckian approach to progress23.
Finally, to complete this summary, Spencer has two chapters in
Data of Ethics titled «Egoism versus Altruism» and «Altruism versus Ego-
ism». To abbreviate, Spencer concludes it is not possible to construct and
ethical system on either one of these principles and hence the next chapter
titled «Conciliation» proposes that during evolution, a conciliation between
the interests of the species, the interests of the parents and the interests of
the offspring has been developed24. This ambivalence between egoism and
altruism and the explanation of both will be a prominent feature in evolu-
tionary ethics up to the present time.
Modern Sociobiology
Thomas Henry Huxley lived at the same time as Darwin and had
the title Darwin’s bulldog for his vigorous defence of Darwinism. Never-
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20. SPENCER, Herbert, Data of Ethics, 1879, Chapter IV: § 18.
21. Ibid., Chapter IV: §§ 19, 20.
22. Ibid., Chapter VII: § 45.
23. This same tendency can also be seen in Singer, as some of the critiques of his
book noted.
24. Ibid., Chapter XIV: § 92.
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theless, Huxley tried to distance ethics from evolution with regard to
morality, seeing a need for external moral principles to guide humans rather
than be at the mercy of evolutionary forces.
His grandson, Julian Huxley, tried to revitalise evolutionary ethics
during the twentieth century, going against his grandfather’s separation of
ethics and evolution. Along with others, Huxley tried to construct evolu-
tionary ethics their efforts taking shape in the social Darwinian school of
the 1930’s25.
The modern term «sociobiology» was coined around this time as
part of an initiative to begin new interdisciplinary research between zoolo-
gy and sociology with the aim of finding valid links between the social be-
haviour of animals and humans.
The most significant modern revival was initiated by Edward O
Wilson, professor of zoology at Harvard University, who won the Pulitzer
Prize for his work in this area. Wilson’s work on this subject Sociobiology:
The New Synthesis forms the basis of Singer’s analysis26. His ideas have
been covered in chapter one of this thesis.
Singer, aware that a revival was occurring with Wilson, aimed to ful-
fil what he considered the ideal of the moral philosopher, using the latest
scientific data and applying it to ethics27. Wilson claimed that the theory of
natural selection should be pursued to explain ethics «at all depths». In an
earlier book, he made the bold claim that «scientists and humanists should
consider together the possibility that the time has come for ethics to be re-
moved temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized»28.
At the outset, Singer stresses that sociobiology will often produce
crude results, but he believed that «the sociobiological approach to ethics
does tell us something important about ethics, something we can use to
gain a better understanding of ethics than has hitherto been possible»29.
He would ridicule those who did not take this seriously: «Nor am I
committed to the general thesis that human social behavior can be ade-
quately explained in biological terms. My position is only that here we
have a new discipline, or rather a multidisciplinary form of enquiry, trying
to answer some of the most fundamental questions about human affairs. As
long as we continue to study and cite Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx –none
of whose views of human nature can today be ranked as scientific– it
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25. Others involved in this effort were C. H. Waddington, G. G. Simpson, Warder
C. Allee, Theodosius Dobzhansky.
26. WILSON, Edward O., Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975.
27. See section on Moral Expertise in Chapter two of thesis.
28. WILSON, Edward O., Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1975, p. 27.
29. SINGER, Peter, The Expanding Circle..., Preface xi.
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would be perversely backward-looking to refuse even to consider sociobi-
ology and what follows from it»30.
The present «scientific» situation of evolutionary ethics
Leaving aside the musings, many times fanciful, of sociobiologists,
human societies with their large structures of organization, a complex set
of relationships in cooperation and interaction are on present evidence
unique in the animal kingdom.
Among other primates –for whom Singer has a particular interest
and which he employs as part of his argumentation– the cooperation is
markedly inferior despite some common genetic ancestry. In fact, ants, bees
and the naked mole rat demonstrate far more cooperation, and are the only
exception to this general rule and here it is based on genetic relatedness31.
In the context of evolutionary explanations of ethical behaviour this leaves
a large gap to be explained between these insects, or animals lower in the
evolutionary spectrum, the primates which are meant to be closer and hu-
mans and yet in terms of social cooperation are inferior. Such a divergence
necessitates an explanation from evolutionary ethicists.
Not surprisingly, the altruism of humans is unique in the animal
kingdom. Humans will automatically engage in altruistic behaviour even
when randomly selected and having no kinship32. In the animal kingdom,
manifestations of «fitness-reducing» acts to the actor that similarly confer
benefits on other individuals are largely restricted to kin groups, and even
the firm evidence for this kin altruism remains scarce after many decades
of research for reciprocal altruism33.
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30. SINGER, Peter, «Ethics and Sociobiology», Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.
11 (1982), p. 43
31. FEHR, Ernst & FISCHBACHER, Urs, «The nature of human altruism», Nature, 425
(2003), p. 785
32. FEHR, Ernst & FISCHBACHER, Urs, «The nature of human altruism», Nature, 425
(2003), p. 785. See also: ANDREONI, J. & MILLIER, J., «Rational cooperation in the fi-
nitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma: experimental evidence», Econ. J. 103 (1993), pp.
570-585. Also GÄCHTER, S & FALK, A., «Reputation and reciprocity: consequences for
the labour relation», Scand. J. Econ, 104 (2002), pp. 1-26.
33. FEHR, Ernst & FISCHBACHER, Urs, «The nature of human altruism», Nature, 425
(2003), p. 785. HAMMERSTEIN, P., in Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation.
Dahlem Workshop Report 90. HAMMERSTEIN, P. (ed.), 1-11, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2003. STEPHENS, D. W., MCLINN, C.M. & STEVENS, J.R., «Discounting and reciprocity
in an iterated prisoners dilemma», Science, 298 (2002), pp. 2216-2218. HAUSER, M. D.,
CHEN, K.M., FRANCES, C. & CHUANG, E., «Give unto others: Genetically unrelated cot-
tontamarin monkeys preferentially give food to those who altruistically give food
back.», Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (In press).
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Part of the problem in trying to make headway in this question is
that altruism has been variously defined, with marked variations, and this
leads also to problems in analysis when there is no clarity in the terms be-
ing debated on.
Some economists tend to define it as «costly acts that confer eco-
nomic benefits to individuals», focusing on the behavioural aspect rather
than the psychological34.
Edward O. Wilson claimed altruism is defined in biology, as in
everyday life, as self destructive behaviour for the benefit of others.
Batson defines altruism as «a motivational state with the ultimate
goal of increasing another’s welfare» in contrast to egoism which is «a mo-
tivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one’s own welfare»35.
In this definition, instinctive reflex action or automatic actions are not de-
fined as altruistic. His definitions focus on the motivation, and ultimate
goal which is either to increase personal welfare or that of another. He did
this to highlight within the discussion of altruism a focus on consequences
rather than motives, specifically by Dawkins and E. O. Wilson36. Motive
may lead to action but may not depending on capacity of actor, but motiva-
tion remains present. Implicit in Batson’s definition is to stress «self-oth-
er» distinction in his definition37.
Elliot Sober, a leader in the initial discussions on altruism, distin-
guished between three different terms: evolutionary altruism, psychologi-
cal altruism and morality. The distinction between the evolutionary and the
psychological form is that it is not necessary to be in possession of ration-
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35. BATSON, Daniel, C., «Experimental Tests for the Existence of Altruism», Pro-
ceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 2
(1992), pp. 69-78. Specifically defined on page 69.
36. DAWKINS, Richard, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, New York 1976.
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These did not enter his definition of altruism. Moreover, for Batson, altruism need not
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highlight altruism and its distinction from egoism, also claimed that a single motive can-
not be both altruistic and egoistic as this implies two goals and hence diff motive.
A person can be egoistic or altruistic and not know it, consequently in his experi-
mentation Batson would not rely on self reports or introspection. However he appears to
have erred to far in this distinction claiming that people can act altruistically and not be
aware of it, which goes against his very definition and the motivational component. He
does stress cost to self is not necessary part of altruism although may involve it eg. «to
hug to a friend» is altruistic but not necessarily costly. (BATSON, Daniel, C., «Experi-
mental Tests for the Existence of Altruism»..., pp. 70-71.)
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ality to be altruistic or selfish in the evolutionary sense, as evolutionary al-
truists provide fitness benefits on others at their own expense38.
Obviously, this variety explains why serious progress is difficult as
often different behaviour is being compared on equal terms. What is meant
by altruism in human terms is very different from the way it may be sought
in the animal kingdom.
Kin altruism has been the basis of all discussions about altruistic
theory in sociobiology and the possibility of other types of altruism, such
as group and reciprocal altruism, has been based on kin altruism. Being so
important for altruistic theory as the basis of evolutionary ethics, in the
next section is a summary of the history of this concept, and its ebb and
flow, based on a recent analysis of Edward O. Wilson himself.
The «rise and fall» of kin altruism
E. O. Wilson himself highlights the «rise and fall» of kin altruism
as a theory in an article in Social Research. How to explain altruistic acts
has been a key question to resolve in evolutionary biology. Darwin saw
that altruistic behaviour posed a problem (Wilson uses the term «danger-
ous» with regard to how Darwin saw it) to his theory of evolution. For ex-
ample, the social behaviour of ants who form castes of distinct workers
with specialized subdivisions –such as small nurses, large aggressive and
sterile soldier ants– needed explanation as the sterile ants forego their own
offspring and this situation is untenable from an evolutionary perspective.
Darwin would explain it by saying if the queen ant is able to produce more
offspring than a single ant, then the sterile castes would also evolve as part
of the same hereditary type so the type is the unit of selection not the
«plastic forms» it produces39.
J.B.S Haldane introduced the term kin altruism into the terminolo-
gy of sociobiology by explaining that altruistic acts towards kin allows
ones genes to multiply even if the individual never reproduces40.
William D. Hamilton in 1964 developed the kin altruism hypothesis
further proposing more direct genetic evidence through his haploidiploid
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39. WILSON, Edward O., «Kin Selection as the Key to Altruism: Its Rise and Fall»,
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40. HALDANE, J.B.S., The Causes of Evolution, Longman, Green, London, 1932.
Also HALDANE, J.B.S., Population Genetics, New Biology, Penguin Books, 18, 1955,
pp. 34-51.
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hypothesis, promoted by many other sociobiologists, including E. O. Wil-
son himself. This theory was based on the fact that certain animals such as
ants, bees, wasps (Hymenoptera) practice the mechanism of reproduction
whereby the fertilized egg becomes a female and the unfertilized becomes
a male. In these organisms the full sisters are three quarters genetically re-
lated while mothers and daughters are only one half genetically related.
Hamilton claimed that all animals that live such colonial life have this ge-
netic feature and are Hymenoptera. The only exception at this time is con-
sidered to be the termites which practice diplodiploid sex determination
where full sisters are no more closely related than mother and daughter.
Hence, the equation rb > c explains Hamilton’s Rule, where altru-
ism is practiced when the cost of offspring «c» to altruist is offset by the
greater number of benefit «b» in offspring to the recipient and the altruist
is greater41.
However this theory was corrected by Trivers and others, as the the-
ory did not take into account that males need to be produced and hence, as
males only share one quarter of the genetic material, a correction takes
place. Furthermore, it has since been shown that altruistic worker castes
exist in other species not associated with haploidiploid reproduction.
Wilson claimed a return to the theory that natural selection as the
driving force to altruistic behaviour in colonies and the prevalence of kin in
these colonies is not due to the genetic relatedness but seems consequent on
acting altruistically within colonies and hence having common parentage42.
Kin selection which generated an «industry» for three decades has
been reduced, in Wilson’s words, to «a weak dissolutive role»43. This is the
history of kin altruism which forms the basis for all other explanations of
altruism in the origin of ethics, such as group and reciprocal altruism. This
theory is the basis of the initial part of The Expanding Circle calling into
question a significant part of the premises of Singer’s book.
The need of evolutionary theory to explain «egoism versus altruism»
Considered more in depth, it will become clear that ethics is much
more than altruism, although that is a significant part of it. The excessive
focus on altruism and reduction of ethics to this alone is in fact a product
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Social Research, 72, 1 (Spring 2005), p. 164.
43. TRIVERS, R.L., Natural Selection and Social Theory, Oxford University Press,
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of the very nature of evolutionary ethics, as evolutionary theory focussed
on survival of the fittest.
Evolution had all the features of an inherently egoistic which is
why I highlighted Spencer’s own consideration and inclusion in his book
of chapters «Altruism versus Egoism» and «Egoism versus Altruism» end-
ing in another chapter titled «Conciliation»44.
If evolutionary theory is inherently egoistic and concerned with fit-
ness and survival, how can morality, which is a data of life in humans, be
explained? As we have seen, for Darwin this was a real concern. The very
nature of human morality distinguished us from animals.
Evolutionary ethics focussed on solving the problem of altruism
and in the process reduced ethics to altruism. Darwin would explain it in
terms of survival of the «group» concerned. Others theories began emerg-
ing to explain it in terms of fitness. Most explanations remain very trou-
bled, with few causative mechanisms realistically available, and as I have
shown, kin ethics recently returning to Darwin’s original explanation of
three centuries ago to find some justificatory explanation.
The biologists notion of altruism is distinct from the typical under-
standing. Reciprocal altruism, as it is often described by sociobiologists, is
enlightened self interest45. Robert Trivers explained it in the following
way: «...models that attempt to explain altruistic behaviour in terms of nat-
ural selection are models designed to take the altruism out of altruism»46.
Hamilton, as we have seen above, had spoken of «inclusive fitness»
which is the evolutionary fitness when one organism is not acting for its own
good (fitness), not the fitness of the «doer» of the altruistic act but on close
relatives. However, this is also not altruism but rather self interest. If my aim
is to increase the fitness of a group etc because it suits me –inclusive fitness–
then this does not fit the definition of altruism if it is defined as acting with
an intention to assist the interest of others at the expense of his own interests.
Egoistic interpretations of altruism in humans fail to produce evi-
dence and do not work. Batson and his colleagues have designed interest-
ing experiments which give opposite explanations to egoistic accounts of
altruism47.
Fehr’s published research in the journal Nature (which was partly
outlined above) indicated that if studies are done on the nature of «altru-
ism» in humans, the observational approach reveals factors which cannot
be explained by biology.
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This very troubled reality of providing an explanation for altruism
has had various defenders. Sesardic, in an article in Ethics, attempted to in-
troduce a more nuanced consideration of altruism –as explained above
something already prefaced by Eliot Sober– distinguishing between psy-
chological altruism (altruismp), which is to act to advance the interests of
another at the expense of one’s own, and evolutionary altruism (altruism
e
),
which is the effect of the behaviour that increases the fitness of another or-
ganism at the expense of one’s own.
He argues that «although we lack direct evidence in favour of (evo-
lution of psychological altruism through natural selection) –because there
is no generally accepted causal story about how altruismp was produced by
natural selection– there is nevertheless weighty indirect evidence support-
ing it. The very nature of the altruismp predisposition in humans, the fact
that it is so widespread, that it extends at least as far back in time as to the
period of hunter-gatherers, that is sustained by powerful emotions, that it is
already present in very early childhood (Schwartz 1993, p. 322), and that it
occupies such a manifestly central place in human mentality, all this taken
together strongly suggests that altruism has its roots in our evolutionary
past. This is not a knockdown proof, but in the opinion of many scholars
such considerations carry enough weight to regard the evolution of psy-
chological altruism through natural selection as much more than just a
fruitful working hypothesis»48.
Alternate explanations are that it was once selective but no longer is
or that it was or is attached to something that was selective, such as a ves-
tige or a byproduct49.
Mark Ridley and Richard Dawkins said: «Civilized human behav-
iour has about as much connection with natural selection as does the behav-
iour of a circus on a unicycle... Similarly, there probably is a connection to
be found between civilized behaviour and natural selection, but it is unlike-
ly to be obvious on the surface»50. The fact that a bear can balance on a uni-
cycle is a result of natural selection but it is absurd to suggest that the skill
of riding a unicycle makes bears better adapted to the environment51.
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cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 49
The vestige theory claims that altruism once provided fitness but
now in different circumstances it does not anymore do so. Some have of-
fered this explanation, but it is incredible and has been discredited above52.
Explanations such as those of Sesardic highlight the poverty of
ideation surrounding this topic. The reality is that we cannot explain why
on many occasions, humans do cooperate and have a complex ethical ap-
proach if we just resort to evolutions and it is farfetched to say this must
the be the only explanation.
It is true that proponents of evolutionary ethics have never been
able to come to a stable definition of «altruism». Is it just enlightened self
interest? Or is it something more benevolent? Darwin believed that moral
action could be motivated by a genuine concern for society, that is, «he ad-
mits that moral action might well not be in the interest of the individual»53.
Prominent Darwinist Michael Ghiselin adamantly stated: «scratch an “al-
truist”, and watch a “hypocrite” bleed»54.
The dilemma of trying to explain ethics from animal altruism is
neatly summarized by David Stove: «Any discussion of altruism with an
inclusive fitness theorist is, in fact, exactly like dealing with a pair of air
balloons connected by a tube, one balloon being the belief that kin altruism
is an illusion, the other being the belief that kin altruism is caused by
shared genes. If a critic puts pressure on the illusion balloon –perhaps by
ridiculing the selfish theory of human nature– air is forced into the causal
balloon. There is then an increased production of earnest causal explana-
tions, of why we love our children, why hymenopteran workers look after
their sisters, etc., etc., Then, if the critic puts pressure on the causal balloon
–perhaps about the weakness of sibling altruism compared with parental,
or the absence of sibling altruism in bacteria– then the illusion balloon is
forced to expand. There will now be an increasing production of cynical
scurrilities about parents manipulating their babies for their own advan-
tage, and vice versa, and in general, about the Hobbesian bad times that are
had by all»55.
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Bradie, admitting the naturalistic position, and believing no objective morality ex-
ists, was nevertheless very critical of evolutionary explanation for the widespread idea
that there are objective moral standards. E. O. Wilson and Michael Ruse, for instance,
argue that «human beings function better if they are deceived by their genes into think-
ing that there is a disinterested objective morality binding upon them, which all should
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Singer, while supporting some conclusions he is able to derive from
evolutionary biology to serve his purpose, does consider that reason is very
important in ethics and is the only explanation of altruism towards others.
What he understands by reason will be considered in the next two chapters.
Having in the preceding part of this chapter directly explained above some
of the problems for sociobiologists –which apply to Singer and to the ideas
he proposed in this regard– the remainder of this chapter will explore more
specific aspects of Singer and his use of sociobiology.
Problems in Singer’s use of sociobiology
Problems of philosophical reasoning and style
In the preceding pages I have highly different aspects of sociobiolo-
gy and the deficiencies involved in employing biology to develop ethics.
They have offered a critique of evolutionary ethics as Singer proposed in
his works.
The consensus of all the reviews in philosophical journals of The
Expanding Circle (presented in the early part of this chapter) was that the
book lacked rigour of analysis. Compared to the authors I have cited above,
many of them avid evolutionary ethicists, it is clear that Singer did not
present his arguments with the sophistication and scientific rigour appro-
priate to the subject matter.
Firstly, it could be argued that Singer was not a professional biolo-
gist and hence, being a moral philosopher, was not able to present a very
scientific interpretation of the subject matter. Yet as explained in chapter
five, this is a methodological problem which has plagued moral philoso-
phy as it has repeatedly tried to employ the empirical sciences without
knowing the limits of the application of that science.
Secondly, while it may be argued in Singer’s defence that in the ear-
ly 1980’s this scientific sophistication may not have been totally possible
with the data at hand (although a comparison with other articles printed
around this time will also show that this view is being very indulgent to-
wards Singer56), the same cannot be argued for the subsequent two decades.
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«function better». More seriously, if some moral perspectives are merely our genes de-
ceiving us, maybe Wilson’s and Ruse’s own view of morality is nothing more than a ge-
netic ruse. (BRADIE, Michael, The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics, NY State Univer-
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56. One example that could be cited among many is ROSS, Angus, «The Status of
Altruism», Mind 92 (1983), pp. 204-218.
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Singer has not modified his view in any evident way despite changes in
science which was the basis of his argumentation, and continues to write
on this aspect of ethical theory unchanged which is a static approach to
someone who wanted to be very modern in his approach to moral philoso-
phy.
A fair method of judging Singer’s effort in The Expanding Circle is
by the standards of moral philosophical reasoning he himself set for others
as comes through in his own critique in 1980 of Lande and Slades’ book
Stages: Understanding how you make moral decisions. This critique, a few
years before his own book emerged, is surprising in the standards it sets (to
some it may even appear to be hypocritical)57.
Singer is highly negative towards the manner in which the authors
presented their ideas on the stages of moral development and moral deci-
sion making. Among many criticisms offered, he chides the authors’ un-
critical acceptance and use of Lawrence Kohlberg’s research, and specifi-
cally, that they did not cite the criticisms to which Kohlberg’s research had
been subjected.
Singer found Stages to be a very superficial book, aimed at a public
with an interest in moral development theory. «The contrast between this
book and a work on morality by a professional philosopher or psychologist
could not be greater. Scholarly works, of course, are not intended for a
popular audience; but there must be something less vacuous than Stages
which would not be too difficult or dry for the general reader»58.
Surprisingly, reviewers of Singer’s book will criticise him also for
this same problem. As I cited in the first pages of this chapter, Dent consid-
ered that the book does not provoke reflection or thought about the subject
matter it considered and was more a «prepared statement than a piece of
philosophical inquiry and argumentation»59.
Were these authors fair to Singer? It is true that in The Expanding
Circle Singer, within a relatively short space, aims to cover a very complex
topic –origin of ethics, cultural anthropology, naturalist fallacy and sci-
ence, the role of reason in ethics, etc– in trying to offer a foundation for
this moral philosophy?
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However, his methodology is very eclectic, polemical (Dent’s com-
ment of Singer offering a «prepared statement» and not an inquiry are very
apt) consisting of mixing science, with anthropology, psychology, politics
and moral philosophy. While all these areas are important and related to
moral philosophy, the methodology must be respectful of the accuracy and
limits of those ancillary sciences and must be used appropriately.
Singer presents supporting arguments, which are very speculative,
as conclusive arguments. Isolated data are interpreted through broad and
loose extrapolation into complex theories, with little reference to serious
scientific studies in the area.
All this is combined with a collection of names and quotes (he
quotes such disparate thinkers as Plato, Humphrey Bogart, Edmund Burke,
Francis Crick, Johann Goethe, Robert Lee, Levi-Strauss, Becker, Kant,
Hume, Einstein... only to name only a few!) which gives the impression of
breadth of knowledge, a picture of erudition, yet this is more eclectic than
an investigative study of some depth.
To illustrate this paucity and faulty scientific reasoning for someone
who wanted to be modern and professional, I will present schematically
the flow of reasoning and topics in two sections in the book which I have
selected randomly from key aspects of the book.
The sub-heading on «Kin Selection in Human Ethics», which aims
to explain the generalised consensus of kin selection and its role in human
ethics, has the following flow of ideas within four, A5 size pages:
He begins with Sidgwick’s claim that duties to family are impor-
tant, then within the same paragraph he explains the thoughts of cultural
anthropologist Westermarck, followed then by anthropologist Marshall
Sahlin’s views, then the situation of famine relief in Africa which is meant
to be an indication that we care more about our own children then those in
Africa. Following this he presents the views of Plato on the family and
community as presented in the Republic, the efforts of Jewish Kibbutz set-
tlers to create a community distinct from family and the failure of the Kib-
butz projects due to many reasons including funding issues and the present
lack of stress on Jewish society (this is also interspersed with a brief ac-
count of British efforts during WWII to make sacrifices, as opposed of ef-
forts by the government in post WWII Britain in appealing to the «spirit of
Dunkirk» to halt economic decline), then the Communist Manifesto aiming
to abolish the family.
This gives the impression of an extremely unusual and polemical
format for a serious work of moral philosophy. Moreover, Singer here ap-
pears to be convincing all of the obvious, that family is an important struc-
ture in society, sometimes given priority by individuals over the needs of
others. This did not require much convincing for the average person.
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One would presume Singer’s aim was to convince us that this has
its origins not in some moral conviction or law in the human person that
love for family is important, but that it has a definite causal link to our ani-
mal ancestors from whom we have emerged from, and how this is similar
to or different from such an evolutionary feature, if it exists. Singer does
not provide any additional scientific data to support this, other than relying
on Wilson, and as I have shown, Wilson had recanted the explanations of-
fered on this topic in that period. Singer relied on scientific data, which he
does not articulate and explain well how it merges with his theory, and that
data is not gravely faulty. This is a problematic situation.
In the section on reciprocal altruism, an even more problematic the-
ory to explain in modern sociobiology, Singer offers no scientific support-
ing evidence at all. What he does offer are three pages with only some prob-
ability figures (very probable probability figures) as his scientific empirical
evidence to justify a hypothesis that reciprocal altruism can have biologi-
cal origins, a theory at present with no scientific data to support it. In ap-
plying it to humans he dedicates eleven A5 size pages, under the subhead-
ing «Reciprocal Altruism and Human Ethics».
Here he begins by appealing to Marcel Mauss and Claude Levi-
Strauss who stressed the importance of this concept (unfortunately without
providing any citation nor source of their ideas), then a claim that Howard
Becker proposed we refer to man as «Homo Reciprocus» (Singer does not
mention that the article of Becker which he does cite is from 1960 which is
not exactly current research for a book written in 1983 on the current state
of a new area of science). This is followed a proposition of a mechanism for
such reciprocity. He says: «It is surprising how many features of human
ethics could have grown out of simple reciprocal practices like the mutual
removal of parasites from awkward places that one cannot oneself reach»60.
From this example he draws a thesis about reciprocity which to any serious
person is an exaggerated conclusion from a possible scenario. Subsequently,
Singer proposes how a monkey may have worked out who to reciprocate
with, depending on how he receives «grooming» from another: «If I take an
hour meticulously removing every louse from someone else’s head, and she
refuses even to look at my head, the verdict is clear!»61. This is followed in
the same pages by with a citation of the Greek historian Polybus, then a ref-
erence to the rituals of gift giving in certain societies, the ideas of Jesus and
the Sermon on the Mount, the reality of cheating in modern societies and
working overtime as a argument for loyalty and justice, the San «Bushmen»
of the Kalahari and their arguments over spoils of a hunt concluding with a
reference to an altruistic prisoners dilemma. I have omitted a number of oth-
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er things for the sake of brevity which were squeezed within these eleven
pages of justificatory defence of the realistic nature of reciprocal altruism.
The only defence for Singer here is that this was written for a more
general audience. If that is the case, then his own critique of Stages must
be applied to his wort and he must be judged by the standards he set for
other authors. In regard to Stages, he said: «Scholarly works, of course, are
not intended for a popular audience; but there must be something less vac-
uous than Stages which would not be too difficult or dry for the general
reader»62. Ditto for Peter Singer.
More problematic is the fact that Singer has based his theory on
some scientific speculations and hypothesis and has not modified scientific
aspects of his theory as science progressed; especially when it has not pro-
gressed as he would have hoped. While he is not expected to be a scientist, if
he is to look for the origin of ethics in science, then he must also be ready
to modify his theory with the science or accommodate parts of it wherer
needed. E. O. Wilson is more integral in this regard by providing an honest
assessment of the state of kin ethics in sociobiology and declaring that he
had initially supported a faulty hypothesis63.
The origin of ethics and rejection of «traditional values»
In the search for the origin of ethics, Singer wants to explain why
we have certain moral tendencies such as altruism which are a real «data»
of moral experience. He would sweepingly propose, against the tide of ev-
idence, in 1994: «Once we admit that Darwin was right when he argued
that human ethics evolved from the social instincts that we inherited from
our non-human ancestors, we can put aside the hypothesis of a divine ori-
gin for ethics»64. Here we can note part of his project: to eliminate «divine
origin» for ethics which meant Judaeo-Christian ethics and also traditional
ethics in general.
He argued that people resist that our ethics originated from animals,
as we all argue animal reactions are instinctive and we are self conscious.
The efforts to draw these sharp lines have always failed, he claims. We
now have evidence that «chimpanzees and gorillas can learn more than a
hundred words in sign language, and use them in combinations of their
own devising. Scientists are now laboriously discovering what many dog
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owners have long accepted; we are not the only animals that reason»65. It is
difficult to take such emotive arguments seriously, but Singer is serious.
We must make an effort to discover what he wants to say.
As he argued in the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs, finding
an answer for our common ethical beliefs in altruism and biology would
allow for a rejection of traditional ethical views, once we realise that such
views are evolutionary and hence, we can rationally think it better to act
otherwise66. Singer does not look for a total foundation for ethics in biolo-
gy and rejects the «take over bid» of ethics by sociobiologists such as E. O.
Wilson67. In that search for origin, he looks for an explanation of preexist-
ing ethical behaviour. Upo finding that origin, he then can explain its evo-
lutionary source, accept what needs to be accepted, and also try to say that
if ethics is a science –avoiding falling into the naturalistic fallacy which he
highlights at this stage of the book– we must go beyond mere evolution or
biology and create our own ethical system based on other principles. He
would use the analogy of an escalator, which I have already given in Part
one of the thesis, and with our understanding of sociobiology and our rea-
son, we can go to new levels in ethics.
E. O. Wilson’s had proposed in his book that issues such as homo-
sexuality, premarital sexuality, contraception are rejected as moral issues
by sociobiology. Although Wilson’s own argument against the «traditional
ethic» on these subjects is open to debate based on the very theory Wilson
was advocating as I highlighted in chapter one, Singer was only too ready
to accept this conclusion of Wilson.
Sociobiology also allowed him, or at least offered him an argument
against natural law theories of ethics. Singer’s interpretation of natural law
is that it bases what is right or wrong on biological nature. According to his
understanding of this system, something is wrong because it does not ac-
cord with the evolved biology. He would say that we cannot be limited by
biological reasoning but we can use our freedom to make such decisions68.
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68. Singer’s biologistic interpretation of natural law ethics is wrong. Natural law
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biological. In fact, this is one of the few theories that can account for a uniformity of
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He says in his article in 1982 in Philosophy and Public Affairs:
«Philosophers in the analytic tradition have not made any systematic in-
vestigation into the origins of our common moral convictions. They have
regarded that as a task for historians rather than philosophers. As a result
analytic philosophy has been regarded as naively uncritical by many Con-
tinental thinkers, who have been more concerned with the social origins or
our ideas. Now the sociobiologists have added a further perspective from
which our common moral convictions may be scrutinized, the perspective
of our evolutionary theory. If our common moral convictions can be shown
to have a biological basis we may have to think again about accepting
them at face value as self evident starting points of moral inquiry»69.
While conceding some of the difficulties, Singer seems to take
lightly the real difficulties associated with altruism and its explanations.
Although Singer has never discarded or superseded what he proposed in
The Expanding Circle, at the same time he has demonstrated that he skirts
over the real difficulties of the questions by talking of «refining and devel-
oping». He would employ it to reject social contract theories of ethics
prevalent at the time with the popularity of John Rawls’s A Theory of Jus-
tice, which posed a barrier to the introduction of his own new system. It
can be noted in following citation from 1994.
«Is the search for the origins of ethics over? Is it now just a matter
of refining and developing the Darwinian view? In one sense, the answer is
“yes”. The modern scientific approach to the origin of ethics that began
with The Descent of Man has become much more sophisticated in the past
two decades. We are beginning to understand the extent to which humans
are ethical by nature. We know that we are neither purely good by nature
nor purely evil, but ambivalent. No social contract was ever required, be-
cause we were social primates before we were human beings. Neverthe-
less, we tend to compete with each other for food, sexual partners, and sta-
tus. Though Darwin did not clear up all the mysteries of the origins of
ethics (the interplay between reason and desire raises issues that he did not
explore sufficiently), he did provide the outline of what is surely the right
answer to the question...»70.
This «providing the outline» once again goes against Singer’s effort
to put science on a more solid footing. We are left with speculation which,
at best, is empirically very speculative. The stream of modern data and re-
search has gone against the key tenets of Singer’s position. The type of al-
truism he is seeking to explain in humans does not exist in the animal
world. He may imagine it, but it is not real. Yet he remains committed de-
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spite much evidence to the contrary. He is so committed to his theory de-
spite the evidence that he seeing our ethics so similar to elements among
social animals that «they render implausible attempts to deny that human
ethics has its origin in evolved patterns of behaviour among social ani-
mals»71. Such a rigidity to a theory inspite of internal evidence renders
Singer’s appeal to be more scientific hollow.
Unscientific speculation to explain moral behaviour
Singer is aware that humans also undertake great feats of altruism,
such as the examples during the Nazi concentration camps which he him-
self cited in The Expanding Circle. Acts of genuine humanity and moral
order despite abysmal ethical environments72. This all too evident exis-
tence of altruism towards strangers, needed an explanation without resort-
ing to an «external source» (the divine origin which he talks about above)
and Singer acknowledged that.
Although not always employing altruism in his investigation in the
same way, at one point he does explain clearly that selfishness is not altru-
ism and it cannot be considered as such73 It needs to be not self interested
in its motive. To explain this non self interest he gives some other very re-
mote and unproven, hypothesis.
For example he suggests that self interested people are not good for
our welfare and hence evolution will give us an ability to distinguish, yet
no causative mechanism is given, and is so counter evolutionary as self in-
terested people are good for their own welfare and hence, in an evolution-
ary setting they will propagate more and overcome selfless people. This
has been an overwhelming difficulty for evolutionists to explain. Singer
however says: «Evolution would therefore favour people who could dis-
tinguish self-interested from altruistic motivation in others, and then se-
lect only the altruistic as beneficiaries of their gifts or services»74. From
here he claims that evolution will give us a capacity to select genuinely al-
truistic partners. No evidence for this «capacity» is presented, nor any ex-
planation of how we can actually discern genuine altruism from deceit and
self interest under some guise. The entire section reads quite more like sci-
ence fiction, a style full of wild hypothesie and speculation to support his
theory.
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If one cannot resort to external sources of ethics, as Singer has set
himself, to what can be the possible explanation of compassion and altru-
ism toward’s others when it has no possible benefit to the individual?
Singer would turn to Darwin. Yet, the problem with Darwinian thought is
that it is not genuine altruism, but egoism. As I have shown the data indi-
cate altruism is not of that form when studied scientifically and carefully.
As I have shown, the bulk also of modern evidence denies the exis-
tence of non kin altruism or any good evidence for it. Yet Singer persists in
presenting this theory. In his collection of articles on ethics published in
1994, Ethics, he persists in including an entire section of the book, of some
fifty pages, titled Common themes in Primate Ethics, despite the absence
of scientific evidence to support such a claim. This section includes arti-
cles by the well known Jane Goodall (Helping Kin in Chimpanzees), Frans
De Waal (Chimpanzee Justice), etc.
An indicative example of hyperbolic reasoning is the following ex-
ample he offers in his 1982 article in the journal Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs in order to explain why female promiscuity is looked down upon in
society but not male promiscuity. He claimed that the reason lies in the fact
that propagation by males is best done by males spawning many children
increasing the survival of their genes. On the other hand women are limit-
ed in how many children they can bear and in order to ensure longer term
survival, and the possibility of grandchildren who will care for them in old
age, they prefer lasting relationships. Hence, ethical norms following this
suggested biologic connection will not discourage male promiscuity that
can lead to spawning many children, while promiscuity in females which
can lead to «spawning» many children is condemned by society75.
Obviously, this example falls into a scientific error of proposing a
cause-effect relationship without offering any serious connection or evi-
dence to support such a theory. I could propose that if both women and
men spawned as many children as possible, then some will survive and
hence even if women don’t have caregivers in old age, that doesn’t matter
as they have passed on their genes to the next generation and in greater
number as there are greater offspring and they can die having created more
of the species. Having caregivers in old age is not what drives evolution
but survival of the species. More offspring means more would survive in
the long run and once again greater survival of the species. In fact, evolu-
tionary perspective makes more sense and is in accord with the normal
mechanism of proposing group altruism.
From the above section it is clear that theories of the origin of evo-
lutionary ethics can be designed to meet a variety of interesting hypothesie
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any author decides. Even considering Singer’s proposal as remotely possi-
ble from a biological perspective, how would it work? Where is the evi-
dence among animals that reproducing many offspring among some ani-
mals is condemned or regarded as inappropriate. Singer imposes a cultural
and rational assessment onto an animal/human model, with no evidence
for the evaluative component in the animal world. At most, what he can
say is that this code «evolved» among humans. But here, he is not talking
about biological evolution but abour cultural factors and development76.
What Singer aimed to achieve by such examples as the one above
was to stress the supposed fact of double standards in pre-existing codes.
This double standard sociobiology allow us to remove, as it will have no
moral connotation but only ar biological one. This leads us to a key part of
Singer’s use of sociobiology. The aim is to provide an answer to the ques-
tion of the origin of ethics, or more specifically, to provide an answer to
the question of why we have certain ethical thoughts and common ways of
living ethically despite the cultural differences.
Singer, ever since, rejected a divine origin of ethics. As I highlight-
ed, he also rejected a Hobbes view of ethics, which is primarily in this case
ethical egoism as the basis of society, which we have considered in chapter
six. Similarly, he rejected any social contract theories such as that of
Rousseau or those of Rawls in more recent times. He did not reject a cul-
tural origin to ethics, highlighting the thought of Westermarck. He would
state clearly that «sociobiologists who did not allow for a major cultural
component would be a dogmatic fool»77. But although considering cultural
components important, he limits his search for an answer to sociobiology,
as this also allowed for a harmony with his ideas on animal rights and ar-
gument against specieism.
Summary: Reasoned arguments to construct a new moral theory
Singer aimed to employ evolutionary ethics to explain the pre-ex-
isting world of accepted moral codes. This preexisting world is in accord
with something he learned from Hare, which is the level 1 type moral rea-
soning (prole type)78. This «explanation» of many ethical codes allowed
60 AMIN JOHN ABBOUD
76. There, it is possible to offer fictitious connections of imaginary possibilities.
Few serious authors would defend such a claim and if it were the case, it would not be
able to explain why traditional ethics in Judeo-Christian cultures actually encouraged
monogamy, while in other cultures a type of «sacred» prostitution was allowed among
women. Nor could it explain the present situation of male and female sexuality which is
not a reaction against biology but against a traditional ethical base.
77. Ibid., p. 49.
78. I have already discussed this in chapter eight under the section on Richard Hare
and will review again in the next two chapters.
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them to all be open to reconsideration. Once reconsidered and found ac-
ceptable they can be kept; if not, they can be discarded.
As I have shown, Singer’s use of scientific approach is defective
from many perspectives. However, even granting him the benefit of the
doubt on his articulation of the origin of ethics, how did he propose to re-
consider existing codes and construct a new system?
Singer considered the role of reason as essential in ethics. He was
not an evolutionary ethicist in the strict sense and saw the naturalistic falla-
cy as a «limiting factor» on sociobiology79.
Singer gave reason pride of place in ethics. In the next two chap-
ters, I will analyse from different perspectives what he understood by rea-
son, its role and how Singer supports his hypothesis for a construction of a
new more modern ethical system.
2. ANALYSIS OF SINGER’S VERSION OF «RATIONAL ETHICS».
What reasoned ethics meant for Singer and its deficiencies
Singer’s entire moral philosophy was aimed at resolving practical
ethical issues. The difficulties presented by analytical philosophy at the
end of the 1950’s and 1960’s led to the conclusion that moral philosophy
could not contribute to normative moral conclusion.
Singer, closely following the project Hare had established in this re-
gard, did not believe this should be the case80. He considered moral
philosophers needed to resolve the impass’e that moral philosophy had
found itself locked within81. The rise of the «applied ethics» departments
and the «practical ethics» movement was the result of this effort. For this
growing movement a new breed of «moral experts» were needed.
How did Singer see the task of the moral philosopher? He consid-
ered there was a need for a professional familiar with moral concepts and
with moral arguments, armed with time to think and gather information to
adjudicate on these problems. Such a moral philosopher would also be
competent in arguments and detect inferences that lacked validity or con-
sisted of defective logic82.
Singer was not unaware of the difficulties in this project. In the in-
troduction of a collection of articles on applied ethics of which he was the
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editor, he stressed the difficulties, admitting that moral philosophy is faced
with the criticism of being just about emotion, with no objective truth.
While admitting that such an argument is «controversial» (the reality of no
objective truth in ethics), he does not reject it. He limits himself to stating
that even if the conclusion is accepted –that we have no objective truth in
ethics– we should not abandon the goal of seeking «standards of consisten-
cy and relevance» in regard to the important subject matter of ethics83.
This search for consistency and relevance must be borne very much
in mind if the Singerian project in moral philosophy is to be understood.
Here the influence of Hare is quite clear. Hare, in his article «Ethical The-
ory and Utilitarianism», written in 1976, had lamented about the state of
moral philosophy. He claimed that he and others had worked hard in ana-
lytical philosophy to study the meaning of moral terms and the possible
valid reasoning in morals, largely in order to solve practical moral prob-
lems. Yet, to his dismay, he felt that when many philosophers turned to
practical moral problems to resolve them instead of clear logic they had
resorted to rhetoric and prejudice (prejudice being the name he often gave
to intuition)84.
Hare’s two levels of moral reasoning, discussed in chapter eight,
would influence Singer’s approach to «reasoned» attitude to ethics. In his
article «Moral Experts», Singer would not accept the view that moral phi-
losophy should cede to society and to the «experts» in moral issues within
society such as the religious leaders, politicians and so on. He could only
accept this position if both the general principles and the application to
particular cases were «perfect and undisputed». This would be the equiva-
lent to well worked out reasoning of the «archangelic» intelligence. Only
in these circumstances he says could he then live by the code unreflectively
(this is the prole type existence of Hare). However, this was not the actual
situation in his opinion and hence, although it was difficult, this «thinking
out» was important, and he (and others) would need to play an archangelic
role85.
Singer considered the accepted societal ethical norms disputable
and hence in need of reworking. However, he could not just base his objec-
tion on the fact that they were disputed, but they needed to be disputable
on some basis. He had even questioned the possibility of objectivity in
morality, something we will consider in more detail. The impossibility of
objectivity being the case, on what grounds were the views disputable?
He had advocated that we would need to develop our ethics to be
reasonable and considered. This same approach was evident in the works
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of Hare as we have seen. Hare needed to defend his theories against sub-
jectivism, and he would resort to his prescriptivism, being able to «pre-
scribe» because we had a considered well reflected position in our ethics.
Hare’s view on moral intuitions is repeated almost verbatim by
Singer in his article, «Moral Experts». Singer asks for «clarity» in argu-
mentation. This clarity means possessing the facts and overcoming our
«unreflective moral intuitions» in our decision making86.
Intuitionism was in many ways for both Hare and Singer partly a
synonym for religious ethics. What they considered to be those unreflected
prole type views that people have and that by the level two reasoning
(archangel) we can sift out, removing the chaff, and if anything remains it
will be well reasoned. If not, then we begin with some other basis to rea-
son. The project of constructing ethics without religion was very predomi-
nant in the considerations of Singer, especially with regard to bioethics87.
The existentialist philosophers, Heidegger and Sartre, did not ap-
peal to Singer. Metaphysical in their considerations, Singer was not open
to follow their argumentation about the priority of existence and essence88.
He claimed they considered ethics a commitment, a «leap of faith»89.
Accepting Singer’s simplistic reduction of Sartre and Heidegger
for the sake of discussion of his thought, if these authors had reasoned
that ethics were a commitment, it would that imply they considered it to
have a subjective content or essence, reasoned discourse does not con-
tribute anything additional, we must just commit to one view or another
and act accordingly.
This approach does not appear very different from what Singer of-
fered. He himself had admitted, and as I will show again further on, that
ethics depended on desire. If that is the case why not just a «commitment»
as Sartre and Heidegger?
Singer, lite all utilitarians, was vigorously against subjectivism.
Subjectivism and egoism eat away at the core of utilitarianism leaving it
bare and pointless as a moral system. Sidgwick, who according to Singer
was one of the most prominent utilitarians, was vigorously aware of this.
What rational and reasoning meant for Singer is extremely difficult
to ascertain with clarity as will become evident. He had claimed in The Ex-
panding Circle (after considering the merits and role of sociobiology) that
unless there is a rational component to defend «at least one of our ethical
principles» then even biological explanations would lead to subjectivism.
Singer wanted to derive «ultimate ethical principles» from some source.
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According to him, other ethical systems rest on opinion and are open and
not vulnerable to criticism90.
So rational meant at least having one foundational premise to begin
with and then proceeding logically from there. Singer had appealed to a
long tradition of philosophical reasoning in ethics beginning with his refer-
ence to Socratic effort in questioning the existing standards, and followed
by such others as the Stoics, Aquinas, Kant and Sidgwick.
Of particularly interest to Singer was Hobbes’s discovery of Euclid-
ean geometry as an analogy. The geometric model would be very apt for
Singer as his system would be deductive in that sense, having some princi-
ples, or at least one principle, and deduce others.
The rationality he advocated was rationality in a broad sense mean-
ing it considered «reflection» on our own existence and its meaning. Yet,
in the same breath, Singer admits that those who do not take part in it are
not irrational or in error91.
In The Expanding Circle Singer would echo Hare again in some-
thing he considered essential to moral discourse. Presenting his theory
about sociobiology and ethics, he explained that his proposition is specula-
tive. Yet he claimed it was «internally coherent» and contained an «inher-
ent internal logic of ethical thinking»92. Singer had even cited the now dis-
credited work of Lawrence Kohlberg to support his argument for his
generalised appeal to reasoning, using it to support his general appeal of its
importance of reasoning in ethical consideration of average people as they
mature.
Singer’s ideas while largely from Hare, also have some resonance
with the ideas of Richard Brandt on ethical reasoning93. In Brandt’s well
known book, A Theory of the Good and the Right, the concept of «rational
desires» emerges94. Brandt, possibly stimulating Singer in employing so-
ciobiology, had sought a solution for ethics in cognitive psychotherapy.
Brandt considered the answer to what is good, can be found in this method.
People, after exploring profoundly their desires through psychotherapy,
and ruling out such things which create aversions in them, due to bad expe-
riences in infancy or at other stages, would reach a point of having only
considered and calmly reflected desires. The good is what Brandt called
rational desire. These rational desires would give our codes and this is
what we can base right or wrong upon. In such a state Brandt considered
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people would have rational desires of benevolence, but he was unable to
affirm that acting egoistically would be erroneous.
Brandt’s rational desires merge well with what Singer aspired to, a
«consistent and relevant» view. Views that are pondered and reflected.
However, interestingly Brandt acknowledged in the end what he proposed
were desires. They were not statements of some truth. This is what others
would call the non-cognitivist position. Singer, as we will see, held this
view, but was ambivalent about it, because a rational desire is no more
than a desire, and beacuse rational and desire appear to be in conflict. For
Brandt they need not be in conflict if desires can be for a rational purpose,
but here we enter into some external validating aspect of desires and ac-
tions. «Rational» here meant free of negative influences, aversions. It is
difficult not to see that the negativity here is measured against something
objective95. From this view of Brandt’s, ethics will at least be considered
and pondered, which is what Singer advocated.
Yet, Singer did not just want this. He reacted strongly, as we noted,
to Rawls’s view which is also pondered and considered. So obviously it is
a consideration within some broader context of consideration or reason-
ing. What this context is proves difficult to ascertain. In order to get closer,
it is worthwhile considering in more detail the few times where Singer has
volunteered more information about what he means about reasoning in
ethics. One such source is in his article on the is-ought dilemma already
presented in chapter two.
The limitations of Singer’s critique of the «is-ought» dilemma
For Hare, Singer and Rawls, linguistic philosophy and emotivism
had left moral philosophy in English-speaking countries in an unresolvable
situation. The foundations of the problem lay ultimately in Hume, as I have
explained in chapter seven.
Hume claimed that moral obligation cannot be derived from an
analysis of the real world. The solution to this difficulty is not the scope of
this present work96. What is important is Singer’s reply to this very prob-
lematic issue in English moral philosophy.
The very framing of Singer’s reply gives an insight into his views on
reason. The article we have already seen, «The triviality of the debate over
Is-Ought and the definition of moral». To call a question that had plagued a
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line of philosophical reasoning as trivial would either indicate that you had
resolved the problem or that you considered the problem irrelevant.
The first possibility –to have solved the problem– Singer did not
accomplish. Hence, by considering the problem as irrelevant Singer has in-
dicated the importance he attributed to it with regard to moral philosophi-
cal reasoning. His approach reflects an attitude: if problems are unsolv-
able, they are best ignored.
However, this problem was foundational in English philosophy. It
touched upon the very nexus between reason and the possibility of ethics.
Hume reduced ethics to emotion and feeling. Reason does not have a nor-
mative role but only an «executive» role in fulfilling desires. Hume also
subscribed to a moral sense theory which also left ethics in a dimension of
feeling. Even considering murder itself, the content of the act for Hume
could only be found in the moral feeling not in the actual act itself97. With
this background, could human activity have a moral dimension that was
not just subjective?
Singer very aware of this risk preferred to avoid the term subjec-
tivism in his article saying it was «misleading» term and preferring to call
subjectivism «form and content neutralism»98.
To avoid naming the Humean position, Singer imposes another
structure on moral principles which will provide another title. Upon analy-
sis, this reveals the same meaning but avoids the negative connotation.
What «content neutrality» meant was that matter or content involved in
the moral principle could be pleasure or happiness or whatever else was
desired to be pursued as his overriding principle of moral action. The
«neutrality of form» meant that the principle need not abide by what
Singer considered key formal structure such being applicable universally.
What form and content neutrality offered, which the term subjec-
tivism did not allow, was that it implied a «considered» or «reflected» sys-
tem or basis of ethics, not just whimsical opinion, despite the fact that this
neutrality would conclude in a particular system that the acting person
could do whatever they desired or considered. Ultimately, it was subjec-
tivism that was «reflected» or «considered». The person following this
system would take this «neutrality» as overriding because he is acting on a
«coherent» set of principles99.
The neutralist position was, in contrast to the descriptivist position,
a position where a principle must satisfy both form and content criteria
66 AMIN JOHN ABBOUD
97. See chapter seven under Hume.
98. SINGER, Peter, «The triviality of the debate over “is-ought” and the definition of
moral»..., p. 51.
99. When a man does not follow this system, Singer claims he is not acting rational-
ly and we will need to look for some other explanation for his action such as temptation
or addiction, etc. ibid., p. 52.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 66
such as maximising happiness (content) and impartially considered (form).
Once you accept the principle with these features, you can construct a «wa-
tertight reasoning from statements of facts to moral conclusions»100. The
only difficulty with this system is that it lacked, according to Singer, rea-
sons for acting. If someone disagreed with the system there was no moti-
vating factor, while the prior had more motivating factors implicit as ego-
ism and subjectivism usually do.
Singer concluded this article by saying that he has only offered
some proposals or descriptions of the solutions offered to the problem of
the «is-ought» gap. He acknowledges no solution is offered because no
«definition of morality can bridge the gap between facts and action»101.
Singer also admitted that clarity about moral terms, or clarity about
what one means by «moral judgement», are important as pivotal to make
clear. Once clarified, then progress from there should be made from these
preliminary foundations, but philosophers should not get stuck to it. «My
complaint is that what should be regarded as something to be got out of the
way in the introduction to a work of moral philosophy has become the sub-
ject-matter of almost the whole of moral philosophy in the English-speak-
ing world»102.
Singer was vividly aware that within the epistemological and meta-
physical framework of the philosophical system within which he had been
nurtured and worked, Hume had constructed a Gordian knot that was in-
soluble. He was careful not to commit himself to a solution. On the one
hand, he believed we can reason about morality, yet on the other hand, he
could not offer a solution to this problem. A deep ambivalence pervades
his approach to this entire aspect of his moral philosophy, a foundational
and pivotal aspect. This ambivalence colours his approach to the remain-
der of the areas in moral reasoning.
In fact, it is very notable that Singer is very careful not to enter to
deeply into the problem, and in all his writings there is a careful circum-
navigation of this area. A conflict existed between the rational barrier con-
structed between reason an action by Hume, and Singer’s intense desire to
be able to give reasons for action. Yet, he is careful not to offer solutions
and get immersed in intellectual discussions, thus being unable with credi-
bility to offer solutions to «practical ethics». He had seen Hare end in this
dilemma and he was determined to avoid it.
In summary, Singer believes our reasons for acting are determined
by us, and once determined we must put a consistent argument consequent
to this system. He appreciates and tries to foster the system proposed by
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Richard Hare of considering happiness and suffering from a universal per-
spective. However, in the end he cannot justify such a position because of
the fact-action gap. What reason can offer is that once a clear set of princi-
ples is agreed upon, we can adhere to them and build on consistently. A
Euclidean approach to ethics.
Ethical Dualism: Singer as a non-cognitivism and a cognitivist
As I indicated above, Singer was aware of the divide between facts
and action that was created within the empirical philosophical system he
inherited and adhered to, and the inconsistency it produces.
He himself would acknowledge this position in replying to a critique
from Frank Jackson in the book Singer and his Critics 103. «But looking back
at the various places in which I have discussed the role of reason in ethics, I
find that –as I suggested in commenting on Jackson’s firm statement that I
am a non-cognitivist– I persist in having two thoughts that are not easy to
reconcile. One is that reasons for action are dependent on desires, and the
other is that reason can take us to a broader perspective from which the good
of one being is no more significant than the similar good of another. The de-
pendence of reason on desire is simply the Humean view, which has always
seemed to me the natural and obvious position about reasons for action...»104.
Non-cognitivism is an ethical position which claims that «ethical
sentences are not capable of truth, are not truth apt, do not express proposi-
tions, do not represent how things are, are expressions of special pro and
con attitudes rather than beliefs and are to be classed with prescriptions
rather than statements»105.
Jackson in criticising Singer claims non-cognitivists cannot give
validity to their inferences. He gives the example:
– Gambling is wrong.
– If gambling is wrong, then getting other people to gamble is wrong.
– Therefore, getting other people to gamble is wrong 106.
Such sentences cannot be argued by non-cognitivists to preserve
truth as these sentences are not aimed at being true or false. Jackson de-
clares that people make these statements all the time and non-cognitivists
need to be able to give an explanation107.
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Singer would reply to Jackson’s critique with some of his own
counter-examples108:
Frank: What shall I make for dinner?
Morag: Make either chicken or Szechuan eggplant with garlic sauce.
Frank: Have you forgotten that Peter is coming, and he’s a vegetarian?
Morag: So don’t make chicken.
Frank: Shall I make the eggplant, then
Morag: (her voice rising): Look, I told you to make either chicken or egg-
plant, and then when you reminded me that Peter is coming, I told
you not to make the chicken. Can’t you work out for yourself what
I am telling you to make?
Frank: (coolly): I’m sorry, dear, but I really can’t. You have uttered only
imperatives. Since imperatives are not truth-apt, no inferences
can validly be drawn from them.
He also offers one other example:
Doctor: Here’s the prescription. Get it filled at the pharmacy on the way
out. But if you have to drive within four hours, don’t take these
tablets.
Patient: I have to go home in an hour, and I can’t get home tonight without
driving.
Doctor: Have the prescription filled and take the tablets immediately.
The patient may ask further:
Perhaps you didn’t hear what I said-I have to drive to get home, and I can’t
wait for hours before going.
Or possibly:
Are you saying that it is so important for me to get started on the tablets im-
mediately that this overrides your general advice on not taking the tablets
before driving?
In offering these solutions, Singer is claiming that they presuppose
that the form of hypothetical syllogisms applies validly to imperatives. If it
is denied that imperatives have validity that will not help the patient and if
the patient was a logician and aware that imperatives are not truth apt, she
would be no wiser about what to do.
He claims that the problem lies in the fact that true conclusions
stem from true premises, and as imperatives are not true or false, you can-
not apply the above logical reasoning. He hopes logicians will broaden
their definitions to accommodate this difficulty. «It ought to be possible to
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recognise that arguments consisting of imperatives can be valid, while pre-
serving the difference between indicatives and imperatives. My guess is
that the solution to this broader problem will provide us with an account of
validity in ethical inference that can continue to support a distinctively
non-cognitivist view of nature of ethics. But finding such a solution is a
task I shall leave for others»109.
Yet, behind the methodology of linguistic philosophy and the defi-
nitions of validity with regard to types of propositions and specifically im-
peratives, Singer has camouflaged the problem, which Jackson himself did
not address.
The cases he mentions are more of the hypothetical type rather than
imperatives of true moral dimensions. In the first case, if chicken was
made, no ethical problem would have occurred apart from offence to the
guest and possibly a hungry guest that night.
However, even accepting the cases mentioned, the solution of-
fered by Singer indicate the contrary of what in reality non-cognitivists
propose. They actually admit that the imperatives, as constructed by
Singer, are true statements. In asking what to cook, Peter was looking not
just for imperative statements –«Cook this!»– but some factual details
that may help his selection, and once provided he could make a valid
conclusion. The factual detail of Peter’s vegetarianism, influenced the de-
cision. The fact was turned into an ought by Morag. The statements were
truth apt.
Singer concludes his critique of Jackson by saying: «I just took it
for granted that the standard rules of inference work for ethical judgments
as they do for statements of fact. I was more interested in how one could
get argument going between people who differ about the ethics of such
questions as abortion, our obligation to assist famine victims in other coun-
tries or our right to use non-human animals as means to our ends»110.
However, Singer’s stance on non-cognitivism was not as firm as his
mentor’s, and included «added» features. «While I do incline towards the
view of ethics developed by R.M. Hare, according to which ethical judge-
ments belong to the same broad family as imperatives, I am less firm in my
non-cognitivism (...). This is, in part, because I cannot deny the plausibility
of Henry Sidgwick’s claim that it is a self evident truth that from «the point
of view of the Universe», the good of one individual is of no greater signif-
icance than the good of any other111. In The Expanding Circle and How Are
We to Live? I have tried to argue that this, or something like it, is a com-
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mon element in many developed ethical traditions, and that it is something
that we come to understand through our capacity to reason. Thus, I have
come close to saying that there is at least one important ethical judgment
that is true, or can be known. To that extent, I would not want to call my-
self a non-cognitivist»112.
Singer’s assertion of the importance of the Sidgwick «point of view
of the universe» as a principle that is self evident, opens the door to self ev-
ident truths. What are they? Are there more self-evident truths? Why are
they the «common element» of many ethical traditions? How can we justi-
fy this common element? What are the epistemological foundations for
this element? Singer is very silent in this regard and that silence leaves his
own argumentation very vulnerable.
Singer admits that to explain this position, without resorting to
some objective truth in moral statements, can be negotiated by «sophisti-
cated reasoning» but he is honest enough to admit that the reasoning lacks
validity. «I could, no doubt, accept Sidgwick’s axiom but refuse to use the
term “true” of ethical judgments. Then I could be classed as an objectivist
non-cognitivist (...) who hold that “X is good” is a “prescription whose ra-
tionality is a priori derivable”. Sidgwick’s axiom would then become an a
priori rational prescription. But at this point, the distinction between non-
cognitivism and cognitivism becomes so fine that it is scarcely worth in-
sisting upon»113.
The impass’e, which is truly thuo, and a consequence of an inherit-
ed problematic epistemological tradition, is navigated by Singer with a
mental sleight of hand, and with some support form Hare. «The objectivist
who remains committed to being a non-cognitivist could still say: “We can
know that one ethical judgement is rational and that another is not, but
since ethical judgements are prescriptions, we cannot, strictly speaking,
know anything about the truth or falsity of ethical judgements”. To which I
would respond: “Maybe so, but who cares? From the perspective of any-
one interested in the prospects for reasoning in ethics, what your position
has in common with objectivism in ethics –including objectivist forms of
cognitivism– is much more significant that what it has in common with
other forms of non-cognitivism”»114.
Richard Hare made a similar point in Sorting Out Ethics: «The term
«cognitivist» and «non-cognitivist» are misleading... The important ques-
tion is whether one can think rationally about moral questions. In other
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words, are there ways of doing our moral reasoning well or badly? This
important question is concealed by those who speak of cognitivism and
non-cognitivism, and of knowing that moral statements are true»115.
Both Hare and Singer are suspect in their argumentation, ignoring a
logical inconsistency in order to bridge the analytical gulf, with a simple
«who cares» reply or an appeal to «think rationally». A distinction is made
between truth in propositions and rational discourse. A void is introduced
by claiming that we can argue reasonably or rationally about ethics, but that
we cannot know if it is true. If that is the case, maybe the person listening to
Singer or Hare mights say «my logic, my rationality tells me something dif-
ferent from yours». They will be paralysed against this subjectivism. If it is
just an intellectual exercise, with no basis in reality, each one will play their
own «game of rationality», white Hare and Singer can play theirs.
The above paragraphs are indicative of a frustration where English
moral philosophy and its epistemological underpinning had found itself.
Singer acknowledges the system doesn’t work within the philosophical tra-
dition from which he comes from, yet he insists that the end justifies the
means, at least in the case of ethical argumentation.
In a critique of the article The triviality of the debate over «is-
ought» and the definition of moral, Michael Smith believes that Singer is
erroneous in claiming that the «is-ought debate» and the definition of
moral are trivial. «On the contrary these debates acquire significance
precisely because the substantive issue concerns our reasons for ac-
tion»116.
And he goes on to say: «Are reasons desire dependent?, is a sub-
stantive philosophical question if ever there was one. Singer is therefore
wrong that the debate over “is-ought” is trivial. Moreover, and importantly
(...) this substantive philosophical question must be answered in the affir-
mative if we want to hold on to some fairly common sense assumptions
about the nature of morality»117.
Smith admits that if moral beliefs and reason are desire dependent
we can never have ethical discourse: «...desires for ends themselves can
be caused not rationalised. It therefore looks like we could only ever get
people to acquire such desires via a process akin to conversion. Even
though it might look like we are engaged in a rational argument, we
would in fact have to use rhetoric, or association, or manipulation of some
other kind, in order to get them to acquire desires for suitable ends. At a
certain level of abstraction, then, the task of getting people to be morally
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motivated would be no different to the task of getting them to buy this or
that product as the result of a cleverly devised and manipulative advertis-
ing campaign»118.
Singer objects to Smith’s criticism but, as can be seen, he does so
inadequately. He claims that his use of the term trivial was contextually
dependent on the debate at the time, he then admits that the debate it is
anything but trivial. However he offers no answer to the real question. He
objects to Smith’s claim that if there are no reasons for action independent
of desire we can only end up in manipulative advertising. «The arguments
I use in How We are to Live? to defend the view that an ethical life is like-
ly to be more satisfying one than a life devoted to earning more money and
consuming more goods could be seen as an attempt to inform people about
the consequences of different ways of living, and thus to help them arrive at
a maximally informed, coherent and unified set of desires. This is hardly
like a “manipulative advertising campaign”. Manipulative advertising cam-
paigns use misinformation or highly selected partial information, and at-
tempt to play up desires which are often at odds with other, more signifi-
cant desires»119.
«Significant desires». Desires that are more informed, more consid-
ered. This is rationality in ethics for Singer and is reminiscent of Brandt’s
rational desires. Yet, Brandt also new he could not negate other ways of
living, such as egoism. Singer rejects egoism as a valid form of ethics120.
Brandt, as I explained, could not say it was irrational to be egoistic. Singer
would reject egoism as being based on uninformed desires, specifically on
the desire not informed by the form of the «point of view of the universe»,
that is universal disinterestedness.
However Smith, highlighted a key aspect of what reason means for
Singer. Singerian rationality, following that of Hare, is not about truth in
statements but more about a method of reasoning that is rational. But rea-
soning is about arguments leading to truth and not just some appearance of
consistency. A syllogism can appear correct and yet one of the premises is
erroneous. It can meet the conditions of rational thought but not be correct.
Ethics is about rightness or wrongness of actions, not rational sounding
reasoning. If the thread of Singer’s method of argumentation is followed,
as I have highlighted in the previous chapter and in this and the following,
his technique is what Smith predicted: it would be a very sophisticated
form of rhetoric, association, manipulation.
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Failed rejection of relativism and subjectivism
In the first chapter of Practical Ethics, Singer devotes a few pages
to denying certain errors about ethics. Two errors that particularly preoccu-
pied him were subjectivism and relativism.
Relativism claims that ethics is relative to the cultural context and
the society one is living within. He considered relativity in ethics wrong.
The only sense it may be correct for him is from a consequentialist point of
view, where in one society something may be wrong because it will not
lead to the best outcome, while in another it will be right because due to
actual factors in that society it will lead to the best outcome. Singer uses a
specific example of «casual sex» which may be wrong in a society without
good birth control and hence will lead to «the existence of children who
cannot be adequately cared for»121, but if there is adequate contraception
available then «casual sex» is not wrong. This is acceptable relativism
from a consequentialist paradigm.
Singer considered that relativism grew in the nineteentt century as a
result of emergence of sociological data regarding non-European societies
which had, or at least appeared to have had, radically different values to
the ones existing in Europe. This led to a view among some that ethics is
relative, lacking objective validity. According to Singer, the Marxists de-
veloped this further by seeing morality as the imposition of the ruling
class, morality thus dependent on economic class in control. He claims that
Engel realised this and added a further claim that in a society without class
antagonism, there could be a «really human morality»122.
If ethics is relative, Singer argues that it is hard to reject such situ-
ations as slavery because people could say that it is accepted by the ma-
jority and hence it is acceptable, the only way it could change is if we
change public opinion. Singer believes these difficulties are enough to
«sink» relativism.
Yet paradoxically, Singer himself had used the relativism of ethics
to reject ethical systems he is not in agreement with. As we have already
highlighted in chapter three, he refers to King Darius to discredit pre-exist-
ing mores and falls into a simple error of logic. I will not repeat the nega-
tion of his false example here123.
Yet, it was subjectivism which generated Singer’s strongest objec-
tions. In chapter, I reviewed Singer’s denial of John Rawls’s assumption
that Henry Sidgwick employed a form reflective equilibrium. Within that
critique, Singer accused Rawls of subjectivism in «the most important
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sense of this misused term»124. As we have already seen, Singer objected to
the very term subjectivism and the way it was used. He was vividly aware
his own system could be guilty of subjectivism if not adequately defined,
as I also noted above.
In accusing Rawls, he defines what he means by subjectivism ex-
plaining that Rawls claimed a moral theory will be seen as valid with refer-
ence to the considered moral judgements the theory is tested against, hence
having no sense in which it could be considered as objectively valid. In dif-
ferent societies with different codes, all the systems could be equally
valid125.
He claims Rawls will lack this objective validity as defined by him,
and hence he falls into subjectivism. Singer’s own theory will avoid this def-
inition of subjectivity within the theoretical framework of his own ethics, by
at least having a formal structure –that is his principles will include a neces-
sity of disinterestedness or equal consideration of interest. Hence, his system
is able to be independent of the other moral theories it is considered against.
Thus, according to Singer, it is not subjective in that regard.
Whether he has adequately portrayed Rawls’ position is not within
the scope of this present work. What is more important is how Singer has
avoided the accusation of subjectivism. Subjectivism as generally consid-
ered, and as considered by Singer, is a system of moral reasoning where
one opinion is as equally valid as another, right and wrong being judged by
personal criteria, not by objective external criteria126.
In The Expanding Circle Singer indicated that without a rational
component to ethics which allow us to defend our fundamental principles,
then biological or cultural explanations «would leave us in a state of deep
moral subjectivism». One ethical principle would have no preference over
another. «If ultimate ethical premises cannot be derived from anywhere,
they are starting points which we choose to accept or reject; and if there is
no basis for making this choice, ethics ultimately rests on subjective judge-
ments which are immune from criticism»127.
Singer would claim that his theory is not subjective because it has a
formal structure (form) being equal consideration and may even have a
content structure (content) which is the seeking to maximise happiness.
These rest on the ultimate principles of universalisability and the pleasure
of utility.
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This may seem initially plausible. However, on close scruting,
when we reflect on his argumentation throughout his work, Singer is guilty
of subjectivism in many aspects.
We noted that he admitted he is a non-cognitivist and could see that
desires are the motive of actions. That would definitely class him as a sub-
jectivist, as desires are personal, variable and not motivating to some ex-
ternal criteria. So, on Singer’s own admission, he is a subjectivist to this
extent.
Similarly, he had earlier claimed it is a self-evident truth that from
the «point of view of the universe», the good of one person is no more im-
portant than the good of another. He is extremely critical of intuitionism. Is
the self evidence of this aspect a result of induction? If so, has he reached it
from the world of facts and hence gone against the fact value divides? If
not, then Singer’s «self evidence» is no more than opinion, and thus Singer
is no less a subjectivist than Rawls.
Further aggravating the claim to subjectivism is his presentation
of the issue of the importance of reason in ethics in his book Practical
Ethics already cited in chapter two. Singer, after presenting the impor-
tance of rationality in ethics, concludes that «the process is not a neces-
sary one and those who do not take part in it –or, in taking part, do not
follow it all the way to the ethical point of view– are not irrational or in
error»128.
How is it possible to be acting unethically and not be in error? It
may be that Singer would have to define deliberate decision not to follow
rational conclusions of ethical reasoning as not error and thus not a wrong
action. If that is the case, this is subjectivism as the system someone else
may choose to follow is not wrong either.
On the other hand, if you are not wrong following what Singer has
struggled to claim is an objective system, then his own objectivity is rela-
tive, and really the actions are opinions and his system is subjective.
Singer could claim that ethics is prescriptive with a logical frame-
work, but one of the main accusations against prescriptivism was its sub-
jectivism and his own claim that you are not wrong to not follow the pre-
scriptions confirms this conclusion.
Further on in Practical Ethics he says: «“Why act morally?” cannot
be given an answer that will provide everyone with overwhelming reasons
for acting morally. Ethically indefensible behaviour is not always irra-
tional. We will probably always need the sanctions of the law and social
pressure to provide additional reasons against serious violations of ethical
standards. On the other hand, those reflective enough to ask the question
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(...) are also those most likely to appreciate the reasons that can be offered
for taking the ethical point of view»129.
Hence, his view of reflection gives the reflector reasons which may
aid him to accept the view offered. Yet, it is an opinion and they may de-
cide to act differently. As he has said: «Ethically indefensible behaviour is
not always irrational». What could this mean? It could be interpreted that
sometimes people may act not in accord with accept societal norms –here
Hare’s level one reasoning is present– and may act rationally on a level
two premise. On both counts, it is subjectivism.
The second part of the above statement claiming we will need the
pressure of law and society to prevent this «ethically indefensible behaviour»
(i.e. sanctions) seem to imply that a person may think they acted rationally,
and has acted according to what he or she thought is correct based on their
own assessment, yet are in error according to some «external» criteria as
the need of laws and pressures seems to imply. Once again subjectivism, as
Singer has defined it and as it is commonly understood, appears again.
The only defence Singer may be able to offer is that the person re-
flected on it and made a considered judgment. Hence, the only addition
Singer makes to what is commonly understood as subjectivism, is an opin-
ion driven action, independent of objective morality that is considered cog-
nitively or reflected. Whether cognitively and correctly is another matter
and Singer may offer some suggestions here, and even forcefully as he will
do in some places rejecting systems that are against his own –the Rawlsian
one is an apt example– yet based on his own analysis it is no more than
subjectivism in the end.
Either way, Singer falls into subjectivism.
In Practical Ethics, he had offered a very brief critique of subjec-
tivism. After rejecting the traditional claim of subjectivism that says ethics
is solely personal opinion, he goes on to articulate three views of subjec-
tivism which he believed were not open to this objection. Considering
these three carefully we find that his distinctions leave he himself open to
criticism of subjectivism.
The first he describes is that of C.L. Stevenson who claimed that
«ethical judgements are neither true nor false because they do not describe
anything, neither objective moral facts, nor one’s own subjective states of
mind. (...) ethical judgments express attitudes»130. However, what are atti-
tudes but a state of mind. What is the distinction? This very distinction ap-
pears subjective.
The second example he gives is that of R.M. Hare who urged that
«ethical judgements are prescriptions and therefore more closely related to
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commands than to statements of fact. On this view we disagree because we
care about what people do»131. A very moving claim, but once again if we
care about what people do, is this not a statement of our state of mind a
feeling? How is this not subjective? What if I care more than others or less
than others? Caring about what people do must be measured against some-
thing objective. Otherwise, we may be guilty of some type of paternalism,
and someone may ask that we «care» a bit less about what they do.
The third was that of J. L. Mackie, who defined «objective moral
standards» as a legacy of religious ethics or personal wants and prefer-
ences objectified. All Mackie has done is taken the subjective dimension of
our thinking and given it a feature which may make it appear to be more
reasoned but remains just as obvious as nothing but subjective because in
saying objective morality is objectified religious or personal ethics, we
have introduced arbitrariness into it.
Singer says that these three authors offered plausible accounts of
ethics «provided they are carefully distinguished from the crude forms of
subjectivism which sees ethical judgments as descriptions of the speaker’s
attitudes»132.
These authors deny a realm of ethical facts which is part of the real
world and Singer does not disagree with this. However, what these authors
all acknowledge is a role for reason and arguments in ethics. So, Singer
does not reject subjectivism per se but a subjective ethics which does not
allow us to reason out our opinions. Considered opinions is what he is af-
ter. However, considered opinions are not a guarantee to being correct.
Someone may reflect on an opinion at length and another may have a view
on a subject, an opinion, which in the end is more correct. To move from
opinion to certainty, the reasoning needs to consider the fact at hand, em-
ploy data, know what we are trying to resolve and the method with which
we should resolve it. Just thinking about it, if we do not reason correctly, it
does not move us any closer to the true view. And in the end, if ethics is not
objectively right, why is an opinion less credible than an agonised non-ob-
jective moral decision?
Summary
Singer argued that the non existence of an objective realm of moral
facts should not be a concern, as long as we do not conclude that there is
the non-existence of ethical reasoning. To defend the practical ethical con-
clusions he would do in Practical Ethics, Singer devotes a few pages giv-
78 AMIN JOHN ABBOUD
131. Ibid., p. 7.
132. Ibid., p. 7.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 78
ing a «statement of the assumption on which this book is based». In his
own defence, he says an entire chapter would be needed to defend his as-
sumptions. Unfortunately, Singer never defended these assumptions in any
book.
Singer argues that the beginning of ethics is the «notion of defend-
ing the way one is living, of giving a reason for it, of justifying it. (...) We
may find the justification inadequate, and may hold that the actions are
wrong, but the attempt at justification, whether successful or not, is suffi-
cient to bring the person’s conduct within the domain of the ethical as op-
posed to non ethical»133.
Defending our notions, reflecting on them, is ethics. Yet, it is not
just that as we may consider some thing as wrong. So the reflection has pa-
rameters of accuracy and truth. This reinforces again Singer’s ambiva-
lence, or more correctly bivalence within moral reasoning, holding two
conflicting positions. Ethics is not-cognitive, and ethics is cognitive.
The very quote cited above indicates the Singer’s subjectivism, be-
cause any subjectivist has thought about what he wants to do and has said:
«I think my system is correct but I also acknowledge yours may be correct,
or we are both correct». This reasoning has met the conditions of Singer
and remained truly subjective.
In replying to his critics in Singer and His Critics, he would lament
about «the apparent impossibility of ever learning to write with sufficient
precision to make my meaning clear to every reader»134. A more accurate
assessment of his problem is that he Singer never presented his thought in
a systematic manner anywhere, and so it is not surprising that critics would
find many inconsistencies or deficiencies in his thought.
This indeterminacy and lack of clarity in Singer has many signs of
being deliberate. Singer is too intelligent to not have considered them. Be-
fore something can be avoided, its existence, and need to be avoided, is
present in the reason.
Singer was all too aware of the difficulties Hare found himself in
over the years in defending his metaethical theories and his repeated at-
tempts to further clarify and improve on his ideas in response to criticism.
Once one presents a complete system, or at least a somewhat developed
system, one is open to analysis and critique. Singer, having witnessed this,
and as we have being more preoccupied with practical ethics, sought to
avoid it.
Extremely intelligent and knowing where weaknesses lay in his
reasoning, and also aware of the strong points of what he had to advocate, it
is impossible not to conclude that Singer would negotiate a trajectory
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which would avoid all the possible philosophical minefields and allow him
to appear consistent so as to advocate his practical ethics.
This lack of thorough development in the difficult areas of funda-
mental moral reasoning is evident in the relative paucity of articles in pro-
fessional philosophical journals critiquing or developing Singer’s thought.
It appears that Singer was not taken seriously as a professional philosopher
in the fundamentals of philosophy and so despite his widespread success in
publishing and sales he was not a subject of philosophical reflection.
My own efforts to study the fundamental moral philosophical foun-
dation of Peter Singer, have illustrated for me this difficulty in trying iso-
late what he actually considered about moral reasoning, right and wrong,
objectivity in morals etc. It has necessitated a thorough and broad search,
with very little presented concisely and, often, as stressed so far and will
be revealed further on, Singer contradicts himself in his different writings.
This contradiction could be considered as evolution or development of a
theory but in Singer it lacks such characteristics. This is the opposite with
his mentor, Richard Hare, where it is very easy to know what he thought
and the progress of his thought.
Singer’s main goal was to change habits and action. In fact, where
he is most quoted and most referred to is in the field of applied ethics. That
interesting field which applies a smattering of moral philosophy, with a
predominant utilitarian focus, to practical topics, predominantly bioethical,
but also economic and political.
Here with a few assumptions that sound reasonable much can be
gained, and the field in the 1970’s and onwards was ripe for the taking.
Everyone wanted to be ethical, introduce ethics committees without resort-
ing to the «traditional» ethical models. A whole new generation of «high
priests» were created, who needed some reasoned and convincing argu-
ments to develop their applied science. As they were in general less aware
of the difficulties Singer would be able to propose his views here with less
criticism.
I have tried to present in this chapter what Singer understood by a
rational moral philosophy. I have tried to articulate it by how he attempted
to negotiate the «is-ought» dilemma which made the possibility of decid-
ing what is right or wrong through reason and beyond desires difficult if
not impossible.
This attempted resolution by Singer necessitated also a response to
the accusation that if the right action cannot be rationally known as true
then all moral philosophy is subjectivist. His response introduced elements
into moral principle of so called content and form which we considered.
While wanting to remain in accord with the Humean non-cogni-
tivist position which he considered as the to be reasonable, he also could
see the need for a self-evident principle of the point of view of the universe
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in ethics, the principle he apprehended from Sidgwick in order to be able
to construct a philosophy.
This introduced another break in his system and resulted in him os-
cillating between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. His own responses to
this duality, which we have seen above, put him in a very ambiguous posi-
tion.
3. PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES OF SINGER’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY:
UNIVERSALIZABILITY AND PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM.
Influence of Richard Hare on Singer: Key principles in Hare’s philosophy
Richard Mervyn Hare, whose key ideas I have covered in chapter
eight, was a significant influence on Singer, leaving a profound impact on
his thinking. Singer would claim that his meeting with Hare was a «deci-
sive moment in his life», and he had not known Hare his life would have
taken different directions135.
In the introduction to Practical Ethics, he remarks: «the mark left by
R.M. Hare, who taught me at Oxford, is apparent in the ethical foundations
underlying the positions taken in this book»136. Singer would in many aspects
adopt the positions of Hare, and would also learn from the Hare’s mistakes.
As a indication of how highly he valued Hare’s thought, in an obit-
uary at Hare’s funeral, later published in the journal Utilitas, Singer would
claim that «when the history of twentieth century ethics comes to be writ-
ten, I believe that it is Hare’s own work that will be seen as having made
the most important contribution»137.
Singer believed as a young student in Melbourne in the late 1960’s
that many considered emotivism to be an inadequate system and Hare’s
universal prescriptivism would replace it. Although Singer’s lecturers in
Melbourne favoured intuitionism or Aristotelianism, he believed they
judged their own theories against Hare138. Subsequently, in his honours year
at Oxford, Singer was required to read Hare’s The Language of Morals and
Freedom and Reason. He would say this style of clear prose would become
a model for his own writing139.
One of Singer’s first published articles, which we have already con-
sidered, «The Triviality of the Debate over “Is-Ought” and the Definition
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of Moral», was guided by Hare. It is possible to see also Hare’s own ideas
in this article. Singer would admit that Hare’s method of arguing became
his own.
Emotivism was the prominent theory in English-speaking moral
philosophy. Its attraction was part ly because was a moral system which al-
lowed the «liberated» generations who wanted to reject the ethics of the
«elders», but would also lead to relativism in ethics, no one system being
better than another. As Singer would claim, all they say before Nazism was
«I disapprove of Nazism: Please do likewise»140.
Hare agreed with the emotivists that moral statements are not de-
scriptive, that is, they do not describe natural objects or non natural objects
like intuitions. However, he would claim moral statements are prescriptive
statements; thus, like imperative statements, they follow logical rules.
Singer suggested an example of such rules: one cannot say, at the same
time «close all the windows» and «leave the centre one open», as there is a
contradiction141. This logic of imperative reasoning Hare thought could be
applied to moral statements. This same logic in moral language would per-
meate all of Singer’s.
The second important contribution of Hare’s thought, according to
Singer, is he would open the door to universalisability, and this particularly
appealed to Singer. A more detailed assessment of Hare’s contribution to
this area will follow, but it is important to note that this formal quality of
moral reasoning also permeates Singer’s approach to moral philosophy.
Singer credits Hare with resolving or distinguishing between criti-
cal and intuitive thinking. This arose in response to the dilemmas in utili-
tarianism and the so called hard cases which were presented against utili-
tarianism. I have briefly highlighted in chapter eight some of Hare’s
proposed replies. Essentially, Hare considered we should operate on a non-
reflective (perhaps on an intuitive level) in daily life and then also embark
on critical thinking at other times. Singer considered such distinctions very
important specifically as he, like Hare, was very critical of intuitive rea-
soning and particularly in moral philosophy142.
Hare had also rejected, in Freedom and Reason, the claim of A. J.
Ayer’s and others that moral philosophy is of no use for deciding on the
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correct moral action. He considered this absurd as moral philosophy would
have no point143. He considered all his work in clarifying the meaning of
moral words and moral reasoning, was for an «ulterior motive» to be able
to resolve the practical problems that trouble us144. Singer credits him with
having a significant role in the beginning of the applied ethics movement,
the work that would govern Singer’s career.
Hare’s desire to consider practical ethical issues is evident in en-
couraging Singer to follow his desired doctoral thesis regarding civil dis-
obedience, concluding in Singer’s first book, Democracy and Disobedi-
ence 145. Hare had already written a paper about peace, and the would later
write articles such as «What is Wrong with Slavery», «Abortion and the
Golden Rule» and so on146-147.
Hare also prepared in many ways, and probably subconsciously,
Singer’s views on speciesism. Singer acknowledges that Hare had written
in 1962, well over a decade before Singer’s Animal Liberation, the follow-
ing quote, crediting him with summarising the essence of his own ideas.
Hare had said: «In all cases the principle is the same, am I prepared to ac-
cept a maxim which would allow this to be done to me, were I in the posi-
tion of this man or animal, and capable of having only the experiences, de-
sires etc of him or it»148.
Hare’s work also coincided with the minimisation of the impor-
tance of Oxford, and dominance of American universities and moral
philosophers. His reaction to the widespread popularity of Rawls is a re-
flection of this strain, and is also reflected in Singer’s writings.
As we have discussed, the emphasis in ethics was moving to «practi-
cal ethics» rather than to metaethics, and American universities accepted
this move with open arms. As I stressed in chapter eight, Hare was critical
of this effort: «If philosophers are going to apply ethical theory successfully
to practical issues, they must first have a theory... Moral philosophy there-
fore needs a basis in philosophical logic, the logic of the moral concepts»149.
As is very evident, Hare left a profound impact on Singer, and that
impact would remain throughout Singer’s career. Yet Singer never devel-
oped works on fundamental questions of moral philosophy because he also
saw the difficulties and ridiculous positions that Hare would end up in. It
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appears that Singer would keep his ideas as vague as possible and hence
less open to direct critique.
Universalisability as a key principle in ethics and the basis
of utilitarianism
As we have noted, Hare introduced the notion of universalisability
into moral language. We have summarized how Singer saw this notion in
chapter three and how he merges it in many occasions with Sidgwick’s no-
tion of disinterestedness, being in some ways for him indistinguishable, at
times both terms appearing within the same sentence.
Singer inherited this «formal» aspect of moral judgments, univer-
salisability, from Hare for whom it flowed from the structure of his theory
of moral language and prescriptivism.
Singer considered the notion of universalisability evident in many
philosophical traditions –Jewish, Christian, Stoic and Kantian notions of
ethics– but he believes Hare gave it a «logical precision»150.
He claims: «In Hare’s treatment, however, these ideas were refined
so as to eliminate their obvious defects. Moreover, for Hare universaliz-
ability is not a substantive moral principle but a logical feature of the
moral terms. This means that anyone who uses such terms as right and
ought is logically committed to universalizability»151.
Hare claimed a universal judgment must be based on its universal
properties not being able to include proper names, personal pronouns or
any such property into the moral judgment. If I saw it is wrong for a third
person to cheat, I also must apply it to myself.
It implies that if we judge a particular action to be wrong then any
similar action must also be wrong, allowing for relevant differences. How-
ever a lot will depend on what is allowed to count as a relevant difference.
What are these relevant differences? Hare says all features may count, ex-
cept those that contain ineliminable uses of words such as I or my, or sin-
gular terms such as proper names. So, if someone steals from their em-
ployer to buy a new television it is wrong, but doing so to feed victims of a
Tsunami may make a relevant difference.
This notion of universalisability can also be used to test whether a
difference alleged to be relevant –for instance, skin colour or even the po-
sition of a freckle on one’s nose– is really relevant. Any moral judgment
must be made in all conceivable cases. Hence if a German Nazi claimed a
Jew should be killed, he would also accept that condition if he were found
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to be a Jew. Hence, any principle must be universalisable. With this pre-
supposition, Hare claimed to have bridged the emotivist position to a more
objectivist position. However, he would eventually be criticised by propo-
nents of both positions.
In Hare’s work universalisability was a consequence of the analysis
of moral language. It allowed for functional moral judgments. Singer
himself considered this to be faulty and had offered a critique of Hare’s
theory when he was a young student in Oxford152. He also makes mention
of this concern without referring to it directly in his work Practical Ethics.
Singer’s critique was that if universalizability was a consequence of the
analysis of moral language and if morality was prescriptive a problem ex-
isted. If someone takes as their overriding principle «to do whatever bene-
fits themselves» and made that principle is prescriptive, then we have a
moral principle which is non universalizable. It we deny that this is a moral
principle because it is not universalisable, then morality is not prescriptive.
For Singer that universalisability flowed from moral language alone was
not convincing. He says: «Taking ethics as in some sense necessarily in-
volving a universal point of view seems to me a more natural and less con-
fusing way of discussing these issues»153.
Singer would add very little to the intelligibility of the term univer-
salisability as a formal concept of morals. He would always mention it
more in context of examples and importance. It seemed logical to him that
ethics would be universalisable yet his reasons did not fully concur with
Hare’s.
Singer’s universalisability merges in with disinterestedness which
we have seen in the work of Sidgwick. This alternates frequently with the
expression of the «point of view of the universe». In The Expanding Circle
he explains: «Disinterestedness within a group involves the rejection of
purely egoistic reasoning. To reason ethically I have to see my own inter-
ests as one among the many interests of those who make up the group, an
interest no more important than others. Justifying my actions to the group
leads me to take up a perspective from which the fact that I am I and you
are you is not important. Within the group, other ethical distinctions are
similarly not ethically relevant. That someone is related to me rather than
to you, or lives in my village among a dozen villages that make up our
community, is not an ethical justification for special favouritism; it does
not allow me to do for my kin or fellow villagers any more than you may
do for your kin or fellow villagers. Though ethical systems everywhere
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recognise special obligations to kin and neighbours, they do so within a
framework of impartiality which makes me see my obligations to my kin
and neighbours as no more important, from an ethical point of view, than
other people’s obligations to their own kin and neighbours»154.
More conclusively in Practical Ethics Singer says that a distin-
guishing feature of ethics is that it requires us to go «beyond our own per-
sonal point of view to a standpoint like that of the impartial spectator who
takes a universal point of view»155.
He would go on to stress that «Ethics takes a universal point of
view (...) In making ethical judgments we must go beyond our own likes
and dislikes. (...) Ethics requires us to go beyond “I” and “you” to the uni-
versal law, the universalisable judgment, the standpoint of the impartial
spectator or ideal observer, or whatever you choose to call it»156.
As we have seen, he merges it in with the impartial spectator of Hen-
ry Sidgwick. For Sidgwick this was an intuitive concept. Singer, as we have
seen would call it a «self-evident truth». This impartiality, taking the interests
of others into account and not just my own, gives meaning to Singers ques-
tion «Why be moral». Morality is not egoism for Singer. Egoism discredits
itself from being morality because it does not fit into this scheme of morality.
Morality must consider the other as well, and thus it rejects egoism.
However, this idea does not come from the natural world for Singer.
Hare offered another approximation to it from language and prescrip-
tivism. Yet for Hare, it was also imposed on moral language. It could not
be defended, nor was Hare able to defend it, that someone could prescribe
egoism as an overriding principle. Under the guidance of Hare in the essay
on the «is-ought» question, Singer also acknowledged as much. Sidgwick
had also realised that egoism cannot be rationally rejected without this
consideration and then this consideration of others does need to be accepted.
So although Hare offered a foundation in linguistics for this univer-
sality, it was a linguistic argument and would not have appeal if you did
not subscribe to the prescriptivism of Hare. It did not have the motivating
component of moral language.
Thus the «concern for the others universally considered» is only a lin-
guistic imposition. It must be remembered that Hare did not think moral terms
reflect natural properties nor intuitive properties. Hence it was a «fruit» of
language. If you did not accept the language then the term was not essential.
Yet Hare, and more so Singer, knew that when people begin to rea-
son ethically and seriously want to consider what is right, this posture fun-
damentally opens them up to consider the other.
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Upon reflection, this view is a rather impoverished perspective of
more profound and meaningful concepts in human ethics. Here, the criti-
cism of Bernard Williams in Utilitarianism, For and Against, is very apt.
«A common element in utilitarianism’s showing in all these respects, I
think, is its great simple-mindedness. This is not at all the same thing as
lack of intellectual sophistication: utilitarianism, both in theory and prac-
tice is alarmingly good at combining technical complexity with simple-
mindedness. Nor it is the same as simple-heartedness, which it is at least
possible (with something of an effort and in private connexions) to regard
as a virtue. Simple-mindedness consists in having too few thoughts or feel-
ings to match the world as it really is...»157.
It is unclear whether universalisability is justice or charity, or just a
linguistic tool to impose on our moral equations so that the syllogism pro-
duces the result we want. Is it just fulling duty or is it to sacrifice one’s
own concerns for others even when not necessarily obliged to support158? It
is just a feeling of compassion, a feeling which I may or may not decide to
indulge or something we owe to other people as people regardless of my
feelings.
The very appeal of disinterestedness in their writings stems from
the fact that all of us, the reader, has an implicit understanding of this con-
cept and its importance in ethics and in fact is a paramount aspect of ethics.
It is highly likely that Hare could have derived a multitude of other princi-
ples or conclusions from his prescriptivism. That universalisability
emerged indicates that this was something he «sought» to derive from his
study of moral linguistics and it is not something that just emerged in the
equation. Singer, in part agreeing with Hare and in part disagreeing, also
sought this aspect in morality and realised it was important, but said it was
self-evident, a very nebulous statement in the case of Singer.
Neither author ponders more deeply the source of this principle
which stems from a more prior consideration which is that people are im-
portant, inherently important because of being persons with an inherent
dignity. In trying to invalidate egoism, Singer turns to this principle but he
also realised that he could never invalidate it apart from trying to play his
linguistic «trick» of saying that egoism as a moral principle lacks the form
of universalizability. What would effectively invalidate egoism is founding
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ethics on the need to respect human dignity which comes prior to purely
selfish self interest, something which Sidgwick, Hare and Singer could
never effectively achieve.
We do not naturally consider the others because we consider that
when we speak morally we make prescriptive statements, and uhen making
prescriptive statements, we consider they should be universal and hence
applicable to all not containing any singular terms or proper nouns. No one
thinks like this except a linguistic philosopher and even then they have to
work hard to justify it.
Sidgwick considered this aspect of ethics intuitive and essential to a
justifiable ethical system as we saw in chapter seven. Singer highlights this
universalisable elements existed in many ethical systems: Judaic codes,
Christian ethics, the categorical imperative of Kant and even the axiomatic
principles of the utilitarians. However, this does not mean they all held it
analogously.
Put very briefly, the Golden Rule is predicated on the fact that all
are ontologically equal, made with a unique dignity and hence merit equal-
ity and equal consideration as a person, no one being more valuable than
another. Yet, the principle of equality is secondary to the importance of the
human person and the dignity of that person, each person and every person.
Kant’s universalisability has two dimensions. One stems from his
vision that men can never be means to an end but are ends in themselves,
hence the formulation: «Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only»159. However, a good will must follow the law and the law can never
be a hypothetical imperative depending on outcomes or circumstances but
a universal prescription to guide the will, hence another aspect or dimen-
sion of universality which is again distinct, «Act as though the maxim of
your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature»160.
In Singer’s system universalisability is an appealing concept to his
readers, having an appeal he will not admit is intuitive. The utilitarian is
unable to answer why we should treat all people equally. The utilitarian
cannot explain why one individual is equal to the other. They want to ac-
cord the equality, almost feeling bound to do so, without giving a philo-
sophical justification161.
For moral philosophers such as Singer who commence with this
initial foundational principle –that an ethic must be applicable to all with
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equal consideration– they appear to be stating secondary conclusions and
making them primary. A whole series of questions are raised and not an-
swered.
The universalisability is an indirect appeal to equality and impar-
tiality. Yet, why are all individuals equal? Why must I apply ethical princi-
ples equally to all not giving more weight to my own interests? On what is
this equality founded? Why can’t I deny that equality? Is universalisability
compassion, and if so how can this feeling of compassion be normative not
just be subjective? Is this just an emotional sentiment, a non-cognitive de-
sire, or is there some deeper meaning? An appeal to universalisability
without indicating a more philosophical foundation, leaves the system ex-
posed to the egoist, something Singer saw only too well and hence his per-
petual battle to fend off egoism.
As we saw, Sidgwick would build his justification upon principles
such as justice and prudence, which he defined in his own way, yet ulti-
mately admitting they are intuitive. Singer does not offer equivalent princi-
ples.
The struggle to find a more logical foundation to universalisability
in ethics caused great difficulties for Hare, Singer’s intellectual predeces-
sor. Singer comes no closer to offering a solution to the dilemma, and as I
will show in the section on intuition later in this chapter, he removes his
only possible way to justify its existence in a rational way, especially as he
wanted to offer a rational system of ethics.
Singer’s argument for benevolence and utilitarianism
What disinterestedness did allow for Singer was a real solution to
benevolence, the justification of which had been, as we have seen, a
scourge of all utilitarians. If we are disinterested, take a universal point of
view, then we will consider others. Here we have a an important key to re-
solving the problems of utilitarianism.
Hare in his article «Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism» prefaces what
he would develop more fully in his book Moral Thinking, his derivation of
utilitarianism from prescriptivism and universalizability. Utilitarianism was
not a theme which was prominent in Hare’s early work but became more so
with time. He built his system on the «formal properties of the moral con-
cepts as revealed by the logical study of moral language; and in particular
on the features of prescriptivity and universalizability which I think moral
judgements, in the central uses which we shall be considering, all have»162. I
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will not enter into a critique of Hare here, suffice it to say it was very much
criticised163.
It is interesting that although Singer does not follow exactly the
same strategy, he does approach it in similar ways. Once again, we must
remember that Singer, apart from The Expanding Circle which is more fo-
cussed on sociobiology, undertook very little work in fundamental moral
reasoning to justify his assumptions. As I have already indicated, in the be-
ginning of Practical Ethics he gives a disclaimer for his brevity. However
this brevity, while indicative of a fundamental strategy of Singer’s style, is
what we must work with.
Singer asks in practical ethics: «Can we use this universal aspect of
ethics to derive an ethical theory which will give us guidance about right
and wrong?»164. He believes philosophers from the Stoics, to Hare and
Rawls have done this and have not met with general acceptance.
His conclusion about the Stoics is not quite clear, as it is not com-
monly accepted that the Stoics began with universalism to build their ethics.
They sought a universal moral law which could be discovered by reason in
the nature of things, which is very different from what Singer proposed.
What Singer would call universality for the Stoics is derived from the uni-
versal moral law of the equality of all persons which they would discover
by reason. Hare, it is true, attempted this as we have seen and perhaps his
reference to not meeting with general acceptance refers to this. Rawls’s
project was quite different from this, more seeking to discover reflected
judgements, to derive a consensus view on the considerations of justice.
Singer, in Practical Ethics, explains that in his view that the univer-
sal aspect of ethics is «formal and bare» and so if it were used to defend
one particular system, those doing so would be accused of «smuggling our
own ethical beliefs into our definition of the ethical». However, he then
progresses to do his own smuggling. While not proposing to offer a sys-
tem, he uses the principle of universalizability in ethics to defend taking a
«broadly utilitarian position»165.
Singer says if we begin to reason ethically we will consider the in-
terests of all and not just our own. Consequent to this we will need to
weigh up and «adopt the best course of action most likely to maximise the
interests of those affected. Thus, I must choose the course of action which
has the best consequences, balanced, for all affected. This is a form of util-
itarianism»166.
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He does admit that universal aspect of ethics could deduce other
theories, but according to him utilitarianism arrives «swiftly». In a certain
sense it does come swiftly when Singer asks the questions he wants to be
answered. Hence, again Singer as he does, simplistically proposes some-
thing then saying that this «places the onus of proof on those who seek to
go beyond utilitarianism. The utilitarian is a minimal one, a first base
which we reach by universalizing self interested decision making. We can-
not, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this step»167.
It is interesting to note here that Singer «smuggles» in his own the-
ory. According to him what we weigh up when we do ethics are «interests»
and only interests. Then we will automatically embark on utility from the
very step, but utility in the context of universalizability and so we will
have a classical utilitarianism.
It is very questionable when the average person embarks on ethics
they consider interests alone. What most consider is the right action, not
how to calculate the right, but what is right. On occasions, they may look
at two equally acceptable actions and decide, logically, to do that with best
results overall. At other times, they decide not to do something because it is
wrong despite its results. At other times, they may decide to do what is right
even if their our own interests and possibly the interests of the majority are
not maximised, but they consider it the best course of action. Maximisa-
tion in many natural ways comes after consideration of what is good, what
is right. Singer will consider this as intuitive prejudice. His view of intu-
itionism will be carefully explored later in this chapter, my critique here is
limited to how he considered utilitarianism was the most logical and natu-
ral system to adopt as stated above.
Moreover, in his presentation of this development towards utilitari-
anism in general ethical thinking, Singer introduces a type of «original po-
sition» which is an imitation of Rawls, someone he was vigorously critical
of. Hare had done the same in his article «Ethical Theory and Utiltiarian-
ism» and admitted it. Singer is not so open about it.
More concerning is that from this very simplistic thought experiment
proposed above in the introduction to Practical Ethics, Singer emerges with
his theory of utilitarianism from this and then will go on to make the very
radical normative conclusions about abortion, infanticide an euthanasia
without any scope for critique of his theory generated so simplistically.
Singer, quite bafflingly, after claiming his little thought experiment
led him to classical utilitarianism, would go on and argue (or more careful-
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ly saying that is has «been suggested» thus exonerating himself from re-
sponsibility for this view nor providing citations) that his view of max-
imising preferences was the view of Bentham and John Stuart Mill who
according to him «used “pleasure” and “pain” in a broad sense which al-
lowed them to include achieving what one desired as a “pleasure” and the
reverse as a “pain”. If this interpretation is correct, the difference between
classical utilitarianism and utilitarianism based on interests disappears»168.
This rapid dispatch of quite disputed themes even in utilitarian discourse,
from someone who aspired to the highest level of argumentation, who
claimed Hare had mentored him in intellectual rigour, and who was also
very critical of Anscombe in her article «Modern Moral Philosophy» for
lacking rigour, is dazzling169. Very few would subscribe to Singer’s view in
regard to what Bentham considered and Mill’s view. Even Singer himself
would contradict this very statement, claiming the opposite position, in
other locations without admitting a change170.
This is not an essential point, but just indicative of Singer’s sophis-
tic style of avoiding difficulties and simplifying genuine problems.
Preference utilitarianism and its limitations
Singer developed an interest in utilitarianism in his undergraduate
days. One of his lecturers in particular was critical of utilitarianism, high-
lighting some of its limitations. On considering these criticisms Singer felt
they were unjustified and all had adequate replies.
In 1972 he wrote an article in The Philosophical Review defending
act utilitarianism. While the article has little to contribute to the discussion
on act utility, Singer begins it by saying that much of the criticism of act
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utilitarianism comes from people who propose unusual situations and then
say that the conclusion of utilitarianism conflict with «ordinary moral con-
victions». Following Hare, he says that this is not convincing for someone
who has equal confidence in utilitarianism as «ordinary moral convic-
tions» putting the onus on those with ordinary moral convictions to justify
their own position and indicating that moral norms are open to review and
if utilitarianism rationally leads to other conclusions he would have confi-
dence in those171. Paradoxically in other places Singer will support the use
of these «unusual situations» to attack ordinary morality172.
In the bulk of his writings, however, Singer does not defend act util-
ity per se but a version called preference utilitarianism which seems to have
been introduced by Hare who derived it from his universalisability com-
bined with prescriptivism. He claimed he owed the foundations of utilitari-
anism based on preferences and interests to Hare, specifically the article
which we have already considered, «Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism».
He however claimed he would not take his own version of this system as
far as what is proposed in that article173.
Preference utility has been defended by several other authors. It
seemed like a theory that added something more to utility accommodating
other dimensions of the human person than just pleasure and pain, which is
the true Benthamite position, and at the same time avoiding the introduc-
tion of values to pleasures, as J. S. Mill did, but arguing that people may
want to maximise more than just pleasure or pain but also other prefer-
ences and hence should be accommodated.
John Harsanyi attempted to give a very cogent defence of prefer-
ence utilitarianism claiming it was «justified by biblical –as well as Kant-
ian– principle that we should treat other people, in the same way as we
want to be treated by them», that is, «in accordance with our own wants
and preferences»174.
He argued that this is the only type of utilitarianism consistent with
a term he would introduce which is «preference autonomy» arguing this is
«the principle that, in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given in-
dividual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own
preferences»175.
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However, some people can have irrational preferences and Harsanyi
says the only way we can make sense of this «is to interpret it as a claim to
the effect that, in some appropriate sense, his own preferences at some
deeper level are inconsistent with what he is now trying to achieve»176.
In the next paragraph, he says directly: «Any sensible ethical theory
must make a distinction between rational wants and irrational wants, or be-
tween rational preferences and irrational preferences. It would be absurd to
assert that we have the same moral obligation to help other people in satis-
fying their utterly unreasonable wants as we have to help them in satisfy-
ing their very reasonable desires»177.
The hedonistic utilitarianism of Bentham could deal with this diffi-
culty, as can an ideal utilitarianism, by defining rational wants to those
which are able to produce real pleasure or «mental states of intrinsic
worth» and if not able to do this, then the wants are irrational.
This capacity may appear to not be possible in preference utility but
Harsanyi denies it. «All we have to do is to distinguish between a person’s
manifest preferences and his true preferences. His manifest preferences are
his actual preferences as manifested by his observed behaviour, including
preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless log-
ical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder ra-
tional choice. In contrast, a person’s true preferences are the preferences he
would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned
with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive
to rational choice. Given this distinction, a person’s rational wants are
those consistent with his true preferences and, therefore, consistent with all
relevant factual information and with the best possible logical analysis of
this information, whereas irrational wants are those that fail this test»178.
Preference utilitarianism has an initial appeal, particular in the way
Peter Singer employs it. It is undeniable that preferences are an important
part of normal life and have some role in the ethical life. As Scanlon says:
«Preferences are important when we are selecting a gift, baking a birthday
cake, or deciding where to take a friend to dinner because what we are aim-
ing at in each case is a person’s happiness. Preferences are important because
they show us what is likely to make someone happy, and because a person is
pleased when we take the trouble to find out his wants and satisfy them»179.
It seems that we cannot go wrong if we aim to maximise the prefer-
ences of all humans. It seems like an ideal goal for all of us. Preference
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utility appears as a much more mature goal than standard hedonistic utilitar-
ianism where the aim is to make everyone have maximum pleasure possible
or maximally happy. We are going to please the preference and desires of
all. At the same time, realising that suffering is an evil to be minimised, we
need to consider the preferences of animals in so far as they experience
pain and pleasure.
Although, such simplistic feel good statements can be appealing
they are problematic as foundations of ethics. The real ethical dimension
of human life is much more complex and people are not just machines
made to run smoothly. What of the person who is able to maximise prefer-
ences by lying for example. Lying has always been a common test case for
utilitarians as it is an action which in some cases can have good benefits.
Utilitarians always put the case in a way to please them. What about the
case of a man who cheats on his wife lying to her whenever needed and
maintains a relationship with his secretary. He can be extremely caring to
his wife while maintaining the relationship with the secretary. This is defi-
nitely maximising preferences as considered by utilitarians. The preference
utilitarian may argue against this by saying this is not maximising prefer-
ences because his wife has a preference to being treated «uniquely» or
«honestly». However, here the utilitarian has introduced other values into
the ethical which is what utilitarianism often does. Utilitarianism argues
from understood moral values and tries to justify changes within that value
system. It was what J. S. Mill did in trying to make utilitarianism compati-
ble with other moral principles as Singer stated in his Britannica article
«Ethics» in the section on Mill. Preferences have the implicit dimension of
values and values are an ethical system outside the utilitarian scope yet
utilitarianism will try to incorporate them.
Critics to preference utilitarianism have come from different areas.
Among them has been the utilitarian philosopher Richard Brandt, who has
said it is a confusing idea, as we would need to consider the maximisation
of a variety of preferences, such as proximate and distant preferences,
which make it impracticable and not intelligible180. Brandt gives an unusu-
al but illustrative analogy, especially considering Singers antagonism to re-
ligion. He gives a hypothetical of a person who has disliked priests all his
life and specifically requested that they not be called to his deathbed and
then at his deathbed he has a conversion and wants it. Following Harsanyi,
we might argue this is not rational preference. However, how can we really
decide which preference is worth more, especially considering he has had
the latter all his life181. Similarly Brandt would argue how can we judge the
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intensity of the wants, or if some want more than others, or some who are
phlegmatic and who want things less.
Singer never addressed any of the criticisms against preference util-
itarianism but has adopted an approach of «push ahead». In a society
where we say we should try to satisfy everyone’s preferences meets the de-
sires of a consumerist society where satisfaction is important and appeal-
ing. However, Singer would not be in accord with this, and although he has
avoided putting it as clearly as Harsanyi, he considers some preferences
more rational than others and he would not want some preferences satis-
fied. Some of these ideas come through in some of his writings182. We need
to have rational preferences and if people do not have such rational prefer-
ences they should not be fulfilled. Hence others would need to arbitrate on
the rationality of our preferences and thus an external arbitrator enters into
the consideration of ethics with their own view of the good.
Singer avoided rational discussion of his systems and wanted to fo-
cus more on practical issues. By ignoring inconsistencies in his system,
which through discussion may have been improved or abandoned and
which would have been a more rational approach for Singer to adopt.
A critique of Singer’s rejection of Intuition
Sidgwick, as we have seen in chapter seven, would base his ethics
on his «axioms of practical reason» which were self evident, intuitive prin-
ciples. These allowed him to be a utilitarian but with intuitive foundational
principles. Singer would claim the point of view of the universe –univer-
salizability– as a self evident principle.
In his introduction to an anthology of ethical essays titled Ethics
Singer says: «...can we really know anything through intuition? The de-
fenders of ethical intuitionism argued that there was a parallel in the way
we know or could immediately grasp the basic truths of mathematics: that
one plus one equals two, for instance. This argument suffered a blow when
it was shown that the self evidence of the basic truths of mathematics
could be explained in a different and more parsimonious way, by seeing
mathematics as a system of tautologies, the basic elements of which are
true by virtue of the meanings of the terms used. On this view, now widely,
if not universally, accepted, no special intuition is required to establish that
one plus one equals two, this is a logical truth, true by virtue of the mean-
ings given to the integers “one” and “two”, as well as “plus” and “equals”,
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So the idea that intuition provides some substantive kind of knowledge of
right and wrong lost its only analogue»183.
Singer’s broad and very loose statement denying intuitionism as a
valid form of knowledge in mathematics is difficult to understand and very
contradictory. Bertrand Russell a hundred years ago attempted to reduce
mathematics to «tautologies» (logical truths) but it proved impossible.
Singer seems to be still with Russell at the beginning of the 20th century
while mathematics has progressed much further in one century. To say that
it is «widely, if not universally accepted» among the majority of practicing
mathematicians is incorrect and very difficult to explain. No working
mathematician believes this statement. For example, the standard presenta-
tion of the foundations of mathematics includes the «axiom of infinity»,
which says «There exists an infinite set». You just have to take it (by intu-
ition) or leave it. In no way is it a logical truth and no-one the least bit in-
formed maintains it is184.
Singer will also be at odds to explain how mathematical modelling
of the physical universe has led to the enormous scientific knowledge and
technological advances if mathematics was just a sophisticated game of
chess. Mathematical notation for instance is a shorthand symbolism and a
tool of thought. Thus the relationship between powers and subscripts with-
in the umbral calculus reveals ideas latent in the original mathematical lan-
guage.
The reality is that the position Singer expresses is defended by few
mathematicians. Yet he quotes his opinion (wrong opinion) in a very au-
thoritative manner enough to confuse the non scientific audience reading
his anthology. While once again we may make an allowance for Singer not
being a mathematician, how much allowance must be given to someone
who claimed he wanted to use the latest advances of science to develop his
ethics? This strongly suggests a sophistic argumentative style making au-
thoritative statements with a clever veneer of truth, which on closer inspec-
tion are found deficient.
In his reply to the article by Peter Unger, «Living High and Letting
Die» in Singer and his Critics, Singer says: «Even though it has always
seemed to me so evidently erroneous, the view that we must test our nor-
mative theories against our intuitions has continued to have many adher-
ents [...]»185.
Singer even disagreed with the notion of rights and human rights (al-
though he was never explicit in this rejection) as from his point of view the
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system of rights was not a utilitarianism system of ethics and more akin to in-
tuitionism and hence non valid. He would say in Practical Ethics: «I am not
convinced that the notion of a moral right is a helpful or meaningful one, ex-
cept when it is used as a shorthand way of referring to more fundamental
moral considerations»186. The problem with rights language was that it was
prior to consequences and independent of consequences. Speaking in regard
to Judith Jarvis Thomson and her theory of rights and obligations, especially
with regard to her arguments on abortion187 he would argue a utilitarian would
reject such a theory as «... a system of rights and obligations which allow us
to justify our actions independently of their consequences»188. Elsewhere he
would argue: «The language of rights is a convenient political shorthand. It
is even more valuable in the era of thirty-second TV news clips...»189.
With regards to intuition, the influence of Hare is evident. Hare
continuously ridiculed the merit of intuition. We have already seen how he
tried to explain it as irrationality (and would often name it as such) being
only acceptable as a level one type of reasoning in his system. Singer fol-
lows suit whenever he can.
Surprisingly and in marked contradiction to what he says above, in
a review he wrote in the journal Ethics regarding a newly released «Ency-
clopaedia of Ethics» he says with reference to one of the entries on intu-
itionism in this encyclopaedia: «The article on intuitionism discusses the
objection that we disagree in our moral intuitions but omits the philosophi-
cally more interesting issue of how intuiting any kind of fact about the uni-
verse could in itself provide us with a reason for action»190.
It is obvious Singer is referring here to his «point of view of the
universe» which he called self evident elsewhere. This is an indirect ac-
knowledgment that his own attacks on intuitionism was exaggerated and
erroneous. Singer is admitting that one his own principles were based on
intuitionism.
Singer had mentined elsewhere his conviction about the «point of
view of the universe», which he considered a common element in many
developed ethical traditions, and that it is «something that we come to un-
derstand through our capacity to reason»191.
After criticising intuitionism, aggressively and sometimes with rash
and faulty argumentation, the very pillar of his own ethical system, from
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which he tries to construct everything, even his justification for utilitarian-
ism, is a principle that on all accounts appears to be intuitive.
The form of knowledge which he is critical of in other systems, is
essential to defend his own fundamental principle to which he will return
repeatedly.
The rejection of intuitionism is not so much based on epistemologi-
cal motives as pragmatic ones. Rejecting intuitionism allows, in an indirect
manner, the rejection of so called «traditional» morality which may be
based on intuitive principles. «The account of ethics sociobiologists offers
is incomplete and therefore misleading. Nevertheless, socio-biology pro-
vides the basis of a new understanding of ethics. It enables us to see ethics
as a mode of human reasoning which develops in a group context, building
on more limited, biologically based altruism. So ethics looses its air of
mystery. Its principles are not laws written up in heaven. Nor are they ab-
solute truths about the universe, known by intuition. The principles of
ethics come from our own nature as social, reasoning beings»192.
After addressing variations of Peter Unger’s trolley problem in the
article cited above («Living High and Letting Die»), which test case push-
ing the limits of traditional moral values in the same type of rare cases that
he and Hare objected utilitarianism being subjected to, he says: «Clearly, if
Unger is right, the method of doing moral philosophy that relies on our in-
tuitive judgments of particular cases is in tatters These factors just cannot
be morally significant. If our intuitions really are based on them, then our
intuitions are systematically unreliable»193.
Yet, by denying intuition as a valid form of knowledge, Singer is
left with no foundations for his ethical principle of universalizability and
disinterestedness. He realised this and hence in some places as I have cited
above he tries to leave the door open a bit. His frequent reference to Sidg-
wick and the vague term of «self evident» principles was an attempt at jus-
tification. Yet Singer, by his own argumentation, leaves his fundamental
principles which are necessary to construct his simplistic ethical system
with little epistemological support, or more correctly, in an epistemologi-
cal schizophrenia.
Summary
In this chapter I have analysed and highlighted the influence of
Richard Hare and his linguistic moral philosophy of prescriptivism in
moral language on Peter Singer. The influence of other Brandt and Smart
has also been argued.
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Together with that I have shown the relevance and justification of
his concept of «point of view of the universe in ethics and its problems
epistemologically». I have also explained his version of utilitarianism, its
possible logical foundations and origins both in Hare and elsewhere.
This chapter and the two previous ones have critiqued the basis of
Singer’s moral reasoning, his fundamental moral principles on which he
would build his practical ethics. This moral reasoning, with its limitations,
was in Singer’s case always aimed at practical ethical action. In the next
chapter I present Singer’s view of human dignity from a fundamental per-
spective as this would be the basis for some of his most radical decisions in
bioethics.
CONCLUSIONS
Singer is, without any doubt, the most effective and influential mod-
ern utilitarian philosopher. During the writing of this thesis repeatedly his
entry into public discussion on topics of relevance was drawn to my atten-
tion. He directs himself to a more general audience than the average uni-
versity philosopher, often times preferring the mainstream media to a phi-
losophy journal in disseminating his ideas. In many senses this is wise, as
ethics is about practical action and the teaching of what constitutes wise
practical action.
The Singerian project is practical ethics, to influence and change
action. More broadly speaking, he aimed to construct an ethical system
which is secular, suitable in his opinion for a modern world. He attempted
an energetic critique of traditional (Judeo-Christian) ethics.
To overturn the pre-existing ethical systems, Singer would need to
offer a reasonable and credible philosophical system which could replace
the former. Singer is often called an extremely logical and lucid thinker.
Part of his popularity stems not from the appeal the normative positions he
defends –many times people find them hard to accept– but the appearance
of rigour and consistency in his position.
The aim of this thesis was to examine the credibility of his philo-
sophical system. Is Singer’s moral philosophy logical and consistent? It
may be easy to object to his conclusions about infanticide or cloning, but if
they are well founded on a sound moral philosophy, he is entitled to hold
them. If his system is erratic and inconsistent, then his conclusions will
also be erroneous or at best just opinion.
In trying to resolve the Humean difficulties and the naturalistic fal-
lacy, for Singer, moral reasoning will not be about objective moral truth,
but about consistency and relevance in moral thinking. A pondered argu-
ment is what is important, a sound argument, even though it may not be
objectively true. Singer’s appeal will be this appearance of consistency.
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Yet his own argumentation will not be consistent. He will reject in-
tuitionism but deduce some principles by intuitionism. He will be a non-
cognitivist and he yet will also be cognitivist. He will reject subjectivism
and yet he was subjectivist. He will say that moral philosophy needs to be
more scientific, and yet unscientifically he will persist with theories re-
garding sociobiology presumably based on empirical data and not modify
these theories as the data changes.
As I have explained, Singer wanted to imitate Euclid, as Hobbes had
desired many centuries earlier. To begin a process of deduction one needs
some primary propositions. Hare had ridiculed intuitionism as a valid form
of knowledge predominantly as a rejection of traditional moral values which
he considered intuitive. Singer concurred with this. On the other hand he
could see that Sidgwick’s «point of view of the universe» (universalizability)
was a necessary part of ethics. Hare had been able to discover universaliz-
ability in his prescriptivism. This was not very convincing as it limited uni-
versalizability as a linguistic construct, not an essential feature of ethics.
For many years, Singer would reject intuitionism but at the same
time talk about self evident principles. Sidgwick, the most cogent utilitari-
an in Singer’s opinion, was clear enough to admit this principle was intu-
itive. With time, as I have noted, Singer would change his position, surrep-
titiously introducing the validity of intuitionism as a way to discover some
foundational principles in ethics.
With regard to Singer’s argument for an evolutionary origin in our
ethics, it is clear that at present, if not at the time he wrote The Expanding
Circle, his arguments are based on antiquated if not erroneous scientific
data. E. O, Wilson in his article «Kin selection as the key to altruism: Its
rise and fall» demonstrates a sincere candidness regarding the present state
of research and the need to modify his arguments. While Singer’s position
was distinct to Wilson’s, his arguments for the evolutionary origin of our
pre-existing ethical beliefs were based on the same scientific evidence.
The evidence clearly has contradicted Singer, but he has not changed his
position. Such a reluctance to modify his conclusions, shows aspects of an
«antiscientific» approach in Singer.
I have highlighted the philosophical inadequacy of his rejection of
the dilemmas presented by Hume and Moore. I highlighted that among
moral philosophers the interpretation of Singer’s rejection was not well re-
ceived. Smith quite lucidly concluded that with Singer’s approach al-
though it appears «we are engaged in a rational argument, we would in fact
have to use rhetoric, or association, or manipulation of some other kind, in
order to get them to acquire desires for suitable ends»194.
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Singer struggled to avoid subjectivism in ethics and the label of
subjectivism. I have shown that the only way he could do this was by re-
defining subjectivism. More specifically, he would be subjectivist in a
number of aspects of his own theory. As to egoism, like all utilitarians, his
rejection of it as a system is equally inconclusive.
Singer is an intelligent person. But I have tried to demonstrate that
he is illogical and inconsistent in the argumentation and defence of his fun-
damental principles. I have not in this thesis addressed any of his norma-
tive conclusions. These must be consequent to a fundamental moral philo-
sophical system. If the system is sound the conclusions will also be sound.
I argue that the basis of Singer’s moral philosophy is seriously flawed and
so his conclusions are flawed.
But why is Singer so successful?... Either my assessment is grossly
erroneous or there is more to Peter Singer.
I believe Singer is the best example of modern day Sophism.
In his own article on ethics in The Encyclopaedia Britannica Singer
claims that many of the issues that philosophically divided Plato and the
Sophists remain the same today. He says Plato’s position that good is some
objective property has fewer supporters today and that the «Sophists ap-
pear to have won at last». Disagreement, in his opinion, still remains
whether moral judgements are true or false and whether morality and self
interest can be reconciled, especially if you do not believe in a reward in
another life195.
This is how Singer would summarise the state of moral philosophy
at the turn of the twenty first century. The Sophists have won at last and
Singer, the modern Sophist, among them.
Sophists were considered by Plato and Aristotle as teachers that did
not pursue truth but only victory in debate. They were fallacious reasoners.
Aristotle explained that Protagoras, a sophist of his time, claimed to teach
how to make the weaker argument the stronger. Logical and consistent ar-
gumentation is unimportant, only the final judgement of the audience is
what makes something true or not196. By appealing to emotions and preju-
dices, a position that is false may be considered as true.
The really effective sophists are also quite intelligent, knowing
which arguments to avoid and which to fight. Throughout this thesis I have
demonstrated how Singer, negotiated difficult questions without really ad-
dressing them, or often spoke so little about fundamental questions, thus
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not exposing himself to criticism. One of the few times he articulated
clearly his position on fundamental moral philosophy (not practical ethical
questions) was in The Expanding Circle, and, as I demonstrated, he was
universally criticised.
The classic sophistic technique is the logical fallacy of the straw
man argument. Those who employ this fallacy refute the weakest argument
of the opponent rather than the argument the opponent actually offers. A
straw-man argument is used to position your opponent in a way that is easy
to refute197. As emerged in these pages, Singer would often resort to these
arguments.
Singer’s philosophy is in some ways reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham.
David Hume represented the culmination of classical British empiricism.
The continuation of British empiricism, specifically in the form of utilitari-
anism in the 19th century was undertaken by Bentham and later J.S. Mill.
Frederick Copleston would sum up Bentham in the following way: «Hume
was a greater philosopher. Bentham had the gift of seizing on certain ideas
and welding them into a weapon or instrument of social reform. Benthamism
in a narrow sense, and utilitarianism in general, expressed the attitude of lib-
eral and radical elements in the middle class to the weight of tradition and to
the vested interests of what is now often called the Establishment»198.
Copleston noted that Bentham «skates lightly over difficulties and
treats what is complicated as though it were simple»199. Mill said Bentham
«was not a great philosopher, but he was a great reformer in philosophy»200.
Many of Bentham’s qualities are to be found in Singer. Based on
what I have demonstrated, Singer is an inadequate moral philosopher de-
spite taking pride in the title. He is anti establishment, seeking radical re-
form by taking advantage, like Bentham, of a willing modern day middle
class who pursued his practical conclusions about ethics (abortion, eu-
thanasia, cloning, embryo experimentation, bestiality etc.) regardless of
the consistency of the underlying philosophy. In pursuing the final judge-
ment of the audience, Singer, more than any other moral philosopher in the
last 100 years, has used the media as his podium more than the university
hall or the scientific journal.
Dale Jamieson and Keith Burgess claim Singer is a moral revision-
ist not a constructivist201. If revisionism is understood here in terms of
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changing behaviour, Singer does aspire to that goal. He will do it by be-
coming one of a breed of new «high priest» of moral life –moral philoso-
phers– who with a series of arguments that are quasi «scientific», com-
bined with a knowledge of philosophical argumentation, urge for change in
behaviour.
To his credit, Singer notes hypocrisy in parts of modern society and
the evident lack of concern for suffering of other human beings. He has
strongly advocated for compassion for the poor in third world countries.
This is laudable and merits acknowledgment. But, as I have argued in
chapter twelve, the very basis of such an appeal by Singer is not on gen-
uine compassion as we understand it, but on maximising an abstract equa-
tion of preferences in the world.
The Singerian project reflects the modern ethical debate in a num-
ber of ways. Firstly, it is founded on utilitarian moral philosophy, a sim-
plistic philosophy which skirts over the difficulties presented to it. Second-
ly, it is imbued by a profoundly empirical and materialistic view of the
human person and hence human dignity. While aiming to be «scientific» in
the end it is far from scientifically rigorous. It is imbued with a deep antag-
onism to metaphysics. Finally, it has the aim is to create a «new ethic» in-
dependent of any necessary relation with the preceding millennia of ethical
discussion.
I hope this study will assist in understanding the fundamental moral
philosophy of Peter Singer. I hope it will also help to reject Sophism in
moral reasoning and moral life as presented by the best modern day
Sophist, Peter Singer.
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